Original author: Raoul Pal, Real Vision CEO
Original translation: 0x137, BlockBeats
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Raoul Pal is the founder of Global Macro Investor and Real Vision, a global macro-finance research institution, and one of the most well-known KOLs in the current encryption field. This article is based on the views of Raoul Pal on his personal social media platform, and BlockBeats organizes and translates them as follows:
The recent Three Arrows capital farce reminds me of LTCM (Long Term Capital Management) in the 90s. For those not familiar with LTCM, it is a large hedge fund founded in the late 1990s by Nobel laureate Salomon Bros, an investment bank known for taking risks.
LTCM has always been seen as the smartest wave in the industry and everyone wants to do business with them. I was a young man running the hedge fund division at Natwest selling equity derivatives, and LTCM was my biggest client.
LTCM has three main types of transactions in the equity derivatives market: equity arbitrage, volatility arbitrage and M&A arbitrage. All of these deals were considered low risk at the time, and since these guys managed a lot of money (at least a lot at the time), all the major brokers and lenders were courting them, competing to get the best rates for LTCM, while they themselves Then you can get a high commission, and everyone can get satisfactory benefits.
But LTCM's strategy in the equity market pales in comparison to their strategy in the interest rate market. In the interest rate market, LTCM's positions in both basis trading and volatility trading are extremely large. They are everyone's biggest customers in commissions, loans, and prime brokerage. LTCM has a license to print money. Driven by complex strategies and models, they can return 30% per year, which is typical of the hedge fund industry.
It was not until the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1998 that liquidity in the US dollar funding market began to become an issue. As central banks have been tightening fiscal policy, the dollar-funded game of musical chairs has begun...
As always, When the tide of funding ebbs, the weakest borrowers are often the first to be hit. In 1998, overleveraged Asian economies began to implode, which quickly turned into a global crisis on a grand scale.
As banks start to suffer losses in the Asian sector, the funding crunch spreads and the market's next weak spot emerges Problem solved - risk arbitrage hedge funds. LTCM, with its good access to cash and leverage, wasn't the first to go out, but arbitrage spreads have widened as smaller funds have been liquidated.
At first LTCM was ramping up their trades, which is basically risk free if you have enough money (at least They thought so at the time...). When the weakest hand is eliminated, LTCM will definitely go to "clear the scene". But LTCM's complex model fails to capture a key risk - liquidity. Because their whole strategy is to short liquidity, and liquidity is really in short supply.
Then all the investment banks suddenly realized that their biggest client was the same - LTCM. LTCM has roughly $4 billion in capital, yet they have borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars. Banks began to tighten financing terms one after another, and more copycat funds began to close down, further pushing up the arbitrage spread. Wall Street smelled blood and began to stand against LTCM to hedge its own risks.
Not long after, LTCM collapsed, the Fed had to cut rates, Goldman Sachs (where I had moved to work at the time) and other big banks basically took over LTCM's position and reduced its own risk exposure in accordance with the requirements of the New York Fed. Ultimately, losses in excess of investors' capital were $4 billion. Many investors were wiped out and banks suffered huge losses.
This incident almost destroyed the entire financial system, and the Fed's forced emergency rate cut fueled the Internet bubble that followed.
The crisis of Three Arrows Capital and CeFi lending market has many similarities with LTCM. Obviously, all major CeFi platforms have a major client—Three Arrows Capital, the smartest wave of people in the industry. It now appears that it is the biggest driver of the yield of the CeFi platform...
In the absence of a "crypto Fed", Firms like Goldman Sachs and FTX started scrambling to clean up bad assets, and this is how efficient markets clean up assets. What I want to say is that this is not the end of CeFi or DeFi, it will drive the industry to make better risk management and supervision.
The crypto space will learn key lessons about leverage and liquidity.
After all, the macro backdrop controls everything, and liquidity is a key macro variable. Liquidity cycles will emerge over time, people will find different ways to create leverage, and we will repeat the same thing infinitely in different markets.
Remember: LTCM It's not the end of arbitrage, stock volatility, bond markets, it just shifts leverage elsewhere, creating leverage and yield for banks. Similarly, this encryption crisis is nothing more than a hurdle on the road of digital assets, and this storm will eventually pass (may even have passed, because in my opinion, the peak of liquidity tightening has receded).
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