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DAO Repository Management Guide: 6 Rules to Help Practitioners Understand how to manage Money

Read this article in 8 Minutes
While there are many ways to run protocols, practitioners may benefit from the following guidelines.
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The Defi bull market, triggered by COMP liquidity mining in the summer of 2020, has turned many Defi agreements into fast-growing revenue "monsters". You'd think that puts them in a comfortable financial position, let's face it. DAO  A cursory look at the Treasury seems to bear this out. For example, according to Openorgs.info, some of the top Defi protocols already have hundreds of millions of dollars, even in the   Uniswap  In the case of billions of dollars.


以 MakerDAO 为例,探讨如何实现真正的 DeFi 国库


However, almost all of this assumed Treasury value comes from the project's native tokens, such as UNI, COMP and LDO, as shown in the figure below:


以 MakerDAO 为例,探讨如何实现真正的 DeFi 国库


以 MakerDAO 为例,探讨如何实现真正的 DeFi 国库


While we agree that native tokens in project funding can be used as financial resources, treating them as assets on the balance sheet does more harm than good and is often used as an excuse for poor fund management.


To illustrate this point, let's take a quick look at traditional accounting.


Native tokens are not assets


While Defi tokens are not considered equity in the legal sense, we can still learn from how traditional companies account for their shares. Simply put, tradable stock (all publicly traded stock) and restricted stock (currently vesting employee stock) together make up the company's tradable stock.


以 MakerDAO 为例,探讨如何实现真正的 DeFi 国库


The outstanding shares are a subset of the authorized shares - subject to a self-imposed soft ceiling on the total issue. Crucially, authorised but unissued shares are kept off the company's balance sheet. How could they? Counting outstanding shares would allow companies to arbitrarily inflate their assets by authorizing more shares without selling them.


We expect you to see a connection to native tokens in the DAO Treasury: these are the crypto equivalents of authorized but unissued shares. They are not assets of the agreement, but simply report the number of tokens that the DAO can "legally" issue and sell to the market.


Therefore, it is moot whether the DAO authorizes a small or large number of tokens into its Treasury: it does not account for its actual purchasing power. To illustrate, imagine Uniswap trying to sell as little as 2% of Treasury tokens. When using1inchRouting orders to many on-chain and off-chain markets when executing this transaction will have a price impact on UNI of close to 80%.


The real Defi Treasury


Ignoring the authorized but unissued shares gives us a different and more accurate picture of the Defi Treasury. In this article, we further subdivide non-native assets into three categories :(1)Stable currency(2) blue chip crypto assets and (3) other unstable crypto assets. Using this new classification, Uniswap's assets are approximately 0, onlyLidoAnd Maker's assets exceed $50 million.


But why would a Treasury of this size go wrong?


First, we see that it's not enough to issue new shares, you also have to sell them in the market. This price impact quickly became a constraint on larger sales. But going further, the price the market will pay for your native token is uncertain and highly volatile.


Second, the price depends on overall market conditions. The crypto market has gone through several speculative cycles in which tokens can reach delectable valuations but also crash by more than 90% and stay there for a long time.


Third, when Defi projects are in desperate need of liquidity, it may be related to project-specific risks: for example, token prices also tend to be depressed when a project experiences a large bankruptcy due to a bug or hack and wants to make users whole -- especially if the holder expects a dilution event.


Case study: Black Thursday exposedMakerDAOThe state Treasury


The risk of insufficient Treasury reserves is more than theoretical, as MakerDAO experienced it firsthand during the Market crash of March 12, 2020, commonly known as "Black Thursday." The lack of liquid assets put the MakerDAO credit system at risk of collapse, and although the crisis was eventually eased, it resulted in a significant decline in the value of token holders. Let's see how it works:


From MakerDAO's launch in 2018 to March 2020, DAO used net income buybacks and destruction of MKR tokens (returning capital to token holders), destroying a total of 14,600 MKRS at a cost of over 7 million DAI. The average price of an MKR token during that period was about $500.


Then came Black Thursday, when Maker failed to liquidate its underwater position in time due to a sharp drop in prices and congestion on the Ethereum network, resulting in a $6 million loss to the agreement. After deducting 500,000 DAI in MakerDAO's coffers at the time, it had to recoup the remaining $5.5 million by auctioning MKR tokens on the market. Maker ended up selling a total of 20,600 MKRS at an average price of about $275.


It was not until December 2020 that Maker's cumulative earnings reduced the token supply back to the original 1 million MKR through buybacks, at a total cost of over 3 million DAI (MKR purchases averaged about $500).


以 MakerDAO 为例,探讨如何实现真正的 DeFi 国库

Makerburn shows that the Black Thursday crash resulted in significant dilution of tokens.


To sum up the financial impact, black Thursday's $6m credit loss wiped out $10m of accumulated gains over three years. If Maker had held more Treasury reserves in stable assets such as DAI, it could have avoided the additional loss of $4 million, as they could have used the funds to repay the insolvent loans instead of selling MKR at a distressed price. Or to put it another way, Maker could get up to $4 million in additional value by holding a larger Treasury.


Although it is difficult to assess capital needs in advance, 500,000 DAI makers held as of black Thursday were almost certainly too few. For the deal's 140 million outstanding loans, it has only a 0.35 percent capital cushion, compared with most traditionalfinancialInstitutions hold at least 3-4% of venture capital. And that does not take into account operating expenses and wages, which could lead to further forced selling during a market downturn if they are not covered by non-local Treasury assets.


Learn about buybacks and dividends


Many Defi projects naively view their token as a Treasury asset and may have to sell it at the worst possible time, a result of the lack of a framework for how to do better. While there are many ways to run protocols, practitioners may benefit from the following guidelines.


Rule 1: The goal of the DAO is to maximize the value of the long-term token holder.


Rule 2: When put into practice, Rule 1 suggests that every dollar the agreement owns or receives as revenue should be allocated to its most profitable use, discounted to the present day. Options usually include depositing the money into the Treasury and redirecting itinvestmentOn growth or new products, or through token buybacks or dividends paid to token holders.


Pay the money properly only if it has a higher return for the token holder outside of the agreement (after tax) rather than saving or reinvesting it. In practice, we see many Defi agreements disbursing funds that can be used for growth or deposited into the Treasury for future expenditure. According to our framework, this is a big mistake. In the case of Maker, we have seen how it sold cash in tokens, but then had to buy back tokens with the same cash at a higher cost of capital.


In general, we recommend abandoning the idea that paying dividends or buying back tokens somehow "rewards" token holders while internal reinvestment does not. The most valuable decision for token holders is to maximize the return on each dollar, both internally and externally.


Rule 3: When the above rules are followed, the DAO becomes an aperiodic trader of its own tokens. If the DAO believes that its tokens are overvalued and that internal reinvestment has a good return, it should sell the tokens in exchange for cash and reinvest that cash into the agreement. This is almost certainly true of all bull markets. When the DAO sees that its token is priced below fair value, and it has excess cash and no high internal return, then it can repurchase the token. This is almost certainly true of all bear markets.


Achieve better money management


Finally, we want to share our thoughts on how the DAO should manage its money. We propose the following rules:


Rule 4: DaOs should immediately discount native tokens -- which are crypto equivalents of authorized but unissued shares -- from their Treasurycurrency.


Rule 5: The DAO Treasury needs to survive the next bear market. It may not happen next week or next month, and it may not even happen next year. But in speculation-driven markets like cryptocurrencies, it happens. Build a Treasury that will last 2-4 years, even if the whole market crashes 90% and stays at the bottom for a while.


We particularly recommend two to four years, because you want enough time to survive the longest crypto winter even by known standards, but not to get distracted by getting rich and lazy, or running your protocols like a hedge fund.


Given the known operating costs of major DAOs with large development teams and mobile mining plans, few meet this condition today. This means that most or all of them should use the bull market to sell tokens and build real treasuries with stable assets, which would not only allow them to survive the coming bear market, but hopefully put them ahead of their competitors.


Rule 6: The DAO Treasury should know and hedge its application-specific liabilities. For example, loan markets may plan for a percentage of loan positions to fail each year. Although they didn't say so explicitly, it was implicitly understood that the loan market would take that risk. Thus, underwriting becomes a regular cost on the balance sheet and can be hedged accordingly. At the same time, a leaner agreement like Uniswap may not carry additional risk and therefore can be done with less money.


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