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How can L2 implement self-sorting and emergency exit mechanisms when Sequencer and Proposer fail?

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Insufficient prioritization of self-sorting and emergency exits in design and implementation represents a significant security vulnerability.
Original Title: "A Focus on Sequencer and Proposer Failures"
Original Author: shivam
Translated by: Luccy, BlockBeats

Editor's Note:
The Sequencer is an important component in the Ethereum scaling solution Rollup, which is used for sorting transactions and performing related operations such as block creation, transaction acceptance, transaction sorting, transaction execution, and transaction data submission. The Proposers are responsible for submitting state commitments to L1. Failures of these entities can lead to issues such as review or asset lock-up, and many current L2 solutions lack these key functions, leaving potential failure issues unresolved.

Currently, the "self-sorting" mechanism for addressing Sequencer failures and the "emergency exit" mechanism for addressing Proposer failures have not been given sufficient priority in design and implementation. Shivam proposed implementing time intervals and having Proposers regularly send scheduled messages to smart contracts to address this issue on the Celestia forum.


TL;DR


In L2, sequencers and proposers play a crucial role. Sequencers are responsible for validating transactions and packaging them for transmission to L1, while proposers submit state commitments to L1. Failures of these entities can lead to issues such as censorship or asset lock-up, but there are almost no emergency exit channels applicable to any L2. This article will introduce a solution to address this problem.


Current Situation


As of now, the L2 blockchain ecosystem faces potential challenges in terms of sorter and proposer failures. The sorter is responsible for verifying and packaging transactions for L1 transmission, which may pose risks such as review or shutdown. Similarly, the proposer is responsible for submitting state commitments to L1, which may face failures that cause asset lockups.


These challenges are exacerbated by the fact that sorters and proposers are primarily operated by centralized entities, introducing additional risks such as MEV exploitation or sorter shutdowns. The key aspect is not only to use decentralized sorters, but also to successfully implement fraud and validity proofs, as well as introduce an emergency exit mechanism.


In order to solve the problem of sorter failure, solutions such as "self-sorting" and "queueing through L1" have been introduced. Similarly, for proposer failures, mechanisms such as "emergency exit" and "self-proposal" can be used. Unfortunately, emergency exits and self-sorting were not given sufficient priority in design and implementation, which represents a significant security vulnerability. In addition, many L2 solutions currently lack these key features, leaving gaps in addressing potential failure issues.


L2beat provides information that shows mechanisms aimed at solving sorter and proposer failures cannot be implemented stably.




L2 How to Implement Self-Sorting and Emergency Exit Mechanism


Self-sorting



The implementation time interval is a technical security measure designed to establish a time buffer before forcing transactions to be included through Layer 1 in response to sorter failures. This time delay provides a controlled window for identifying and resolving potential issues, performing appropriate system checks, and restoring operational stability.


When users want to force the inclusion of a transaction, they must call a dedicated function on the L1 scroll contract and then relay the transaction to the L2 sorter's delay queue. This delay queue has two main purposes: first, as a temporary storage for transactions waiting to be processed, and second, as a security measure to prevent potential malicious actors from participating in unreasonable self-sorting attempts. Before being included in the delay queue, transactions must be reviewed and subject to predetermined criteria. This prevents unauthorized or malicious attempts to modify the sorting process, ensuring the integrity and security of the L2 environment.


After a set time threshold, transactions in the delay queue will undergo a batch inclusion process that includes a series of mandatory checks. This time limit serves as a controlled tool to regulate transaction processing time. Transactions accumulated in the delay queue during this period are summarized into a batch and then the inclusion process begins, assuming the preset validation tests pass successfully. The technical complexity comes from organizing this batch inclusion, and the system ensures that transactions meet established standards before being integrated into L2.



Emergency Exit


The proposer needs to regularly send scheduled messages to the smart contract. This message is a preventative measure designed to ensure the continued operational integrity of the proposer. The lack of this communication within the scheduled time frame will result in the declaration of the proposer as non-operational or defective.


When the operation of the proposer stops or the specified message is not transmitted, an automatic mechanism must be started to execute the freezing of assets on L2. The freezing process should include the secure locking of assets within specific smart contracts issued on L2. This step effectively prevents any subsequent transactions involving the frozen assets from occurring until the potential issues with the proposer are resolved. This upgrade ensures that any attempts to transfer or modify the frozen assets are systematically prevented by the system, reducing the potential risks associated with a faulty proposer.


Users can trigger the emergency exit mechanism, which is designed to allow users to regain ownership of their assets in specific situations, especially when the proposer is confirmed to be invalid. This mechanism is designed to be used only when the non-functional aspects of the proposer are clearly identified in the stated standards.


In order to regain ownership of their assets, users need to generate proof of their fund holdings in the form of Merkel proofs. These Merkel proofs serve as cryptographic evidence of the specific assets that the user owns when locking their assets. The user then submits these Merkel proofs to the L1 contract, which subsequently verifies the legitimacy and ownership of the presented proof through a validation process. Only after these proofs have undergone rigorous validation is the Layer 1 contract authorized to begin transferring the locked assets to the user's control.




Conclusion


This analysis emphasizes the importance of overcoming sorter and proposer failures in L2 blockchain to ensure the robustness and security of transaction processing. The current issues and weaknesses, including the lack of priority in emergency exits and self-sorting, highlight the necessity of adopting a comprehensive approach throughout the L2 ecosystem. Implementing these solutions can improve the overall reliability and robustness of L2 blockchain systems, making consumers more confident in the integrity of their transactions and assets.


"Original article link"


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