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Paradigm: The conversion of Ethereum to PoS does not mean that ETH can be considered a security

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The pledge model does not satisfy the Howey test, and whether a pledge is an "investment behavior" does not comply with any of the four Howey principles.
原文标题:《 Ethereum's New「Staking」Model Does Not Make ETH A Security. 》
原文作者: Rodrigo Seira & Amy Aixi Zhang, Paradigm ;Jake Chervinsky, Variant
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1. Introduction


Following Ethereum's transition to a proof-of-interest consensus mechanism (" merger "), different commentators have suggested that Ethereum's new pledge model could result in its original tokens being treated as securities under US securities laws under Ethereum (ETH).


However, these arguments stretch the interpretation of the Howey test to the point of no further extension, and fail to recognize that the fundamental purpose of securities law is to address the problem of asymmetric information, which does not exist in this case.


As explained below, Ethereum's adoption of a consensus mechanism of proof of interest does not make ETH (even pledged ETH) an investment contract, and such a conclusion would prove that the application of securities law to Ethereum is meaningless.


2. Introduction to Securities Law


U.S. securities laws require issuers to register any offering or sale of securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission, unless there is an exemption. 2 Registration means mandatory disclosure, ensuring that material information is shared with investors so that informed decisions can be made, preventing information asymmetries, and avoiding agency problems.


The Securities Act of 1933 lists the types of instruments that constitute "securities," including "investment contracts." 3 According to the Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Howey, an "investment contract" requires (1) the investment of funds; (2) in a joint enterprise; (3) Reasonable expectations of profits; (4) It comes entirely from the efforts of others.


In its ruling interpreting the "investment contract," the court rejected a literal interpretation of the statute and instead adopted a flexible interpretation that focused on the "economic reality" of the relationship between the sponsor and the investor. 5 In various cases where the underlying economic relationship between the parties is not that between investor and promoter, courts have applied the concept of economic reality to limit the scope of "investment contracts" and the application of securities law.


3. Howey's application to Ethereum proof of interest


The proof-of-pledge consensus mechanism adopted by Ethereum has led various commenters to argue that ETH, or more specifically, the behavior of pledging ETH, may fit the definition of an investment contract in Howey. The argument is structured as follows: Pledging ETH as a verifier meets the Howey test because the verifier (1) is "investing money" by locking 32 ETH for pledge, (2) is a "common enterprise" of parties involved in the verification process, (3) expects profits in the form of pledge incentives, (4) These rewards come from the efforts of other verifiers or other parties involved in the verification process.


Regardless of whether a verifier deposits ETH into a smart contract qualifies as an "investment of funds," 9 The argument that Ethereum's adoption of proof-of-pledge results in ETH being treated as an investment contract fundamentally misunderstands Principles 2 and 4 of Howey, and the failure of either principle is fatal. This conclusion would also lead to an absurd and unnecessary application of securities law, since no issuer or promoter has privileged access to information and can or should be compelled to make a disclosure.


3a. Proof of Interest does not involve "joint Enterprise"


3ai. Legal standards


As the Supreme Court said in Howey, an important component of an investment contract is a "joint enterprise." 10 Although some courts have held that a joint enterprise exists only when there is "horizontal commonality," 11 others have held that "vertical commonality" suffices to satisfy this principle in Howey.


3aii. There is no "horizontal commonality" among verifiers


Horizontal commonality exists when the wealth of each investor is linked to the wealth of other investors by "pooling assets, usually in conjunction with the distribution of pro bono profits". In other words, the court emphasized that horizontal commonality requires that an investor's expected profits be linked to other investors "through the entrepreneurial efforts of the promoter." 15 Thus, horizontal commonality requires the investor to give up any individualization claim on profits in exchange for participation and a proportional interest in the profits subsequently distributed by the promoter.


Some mistakenly believe that pledging ETH implies horizontal commonality because the verifier deposits ETH into a smart contract address, which purportedly implies "asset pooling," 17 or horizontal commonality is purportedly found because of perceived "cooperation" among the verifier.


To become a verifier of the Ethereum network, 32 ETH are deposited into a smart contract address (called a "deposit contract"). 19 However, putting ETH into a deposit contract is not a "set" because ETH will never be under the arbitrary control of the sponsor, who can use it to create value for ordinary businesses. Instead, the purpose of pledging ETH is to create an incentive to protect the network; It ensures that the verifier does something in the game so that they can be punished for dishonest behavior. In addition, while each verifier's ETH is deposited in a deposit contract, it does not blend and remain distinguishable. Once this feature is implemented in a later network upgrade, each verifier will also be able to withdraw its pledged ETH.


The individual verifier also has no right to participate in the pro-rata distribution of any profits generated by the enterprise. As further explained below, the payoff varies from verifier to verifier and is determined primarily on the basis of each verifier's individual effort; Their fortunes do not rise and fall together because of the entrepreneurial efforts of any promoter. 20 Thus, in analyzing the economic reality of pledge transactions, the court should find that there is no horizontal commonality.


3aiii. There is no "longitudinal commonality" among verifiers


Some courts have held that Howey's common enterprise doctrine can also be satisfied by vertical commonality, which focuses on "the relationship between the sponsor and the investor subject" 22.

In general, the success or operation of the Ethereum network does not depend on any key party; It is "fully decentralized". 23 To ensure decentralization, Ethereum's consensus mechanism allows the verifier to run itself efficiently without relying on any third party. Verifiers come to the network freely and voluntarily, and they can choose to stop participating. The verifier can fulfill their role in the network without relying on anyone else. If they perform their duties correctly according to the rules of the network, they will be rewarded according to those rules, not according to the efforts of the promoter.


Specific to the economic reality of the pledge transaction, it is clear that there is no promoter on which the verifier depends. Since vertical commonality requires that "the fate of the investor" and that of the initiator "be linked..." 24 closed the investigation without a sponsor.


3b. Pledging ETH is not consistent with Howey's principle of "the efforts of others"


3bi. Legal standards


According to the Supreme Court's original formulation in Howey, one of the requirements of an investment contract is that the investor expects to "arise solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party." 25 This standard has been watered down by appellate courts, which have read "entirely," focusing instead on whether the promoter's efforts are "undeniably important" 26 and "fundamental managerial efforts that affect the success or failure of the enterprise." 27 According to SEC guidance, these efforts are typically characterized by "expertise and decisions that influence business success through the application of skills and judgment." 28


Instead, the court focused on whether investors had "the ability to control the profitability of their own investments." 29 The greater the degree to which the investor relies on his own efforts to make a profit, the weaker the rationale for characterizing the relevant transaction as an investment contract according to Howey. In these cases, the application of securities laws or disclosure requirements is not necessary because ownership and control are not separated. 30 The court further lists several factors (referred to as "Schaden factors") to test the investor's "ability to control" 31 (listed in order of importance). (1) the investor's access to information, (2) the investor's contractual power, (3) the investor's contribution or time and effort, (4) the adequacy of financing, (5) the nature of the business risk, and (6) the degree of speculation.


3bii. Application to Ethereum


Some argue that Ethereum's transition from proof of work to proof of interest is also a transition from a competitive mechanism to a more "cooperative" one, 32 as the verification process in the pledge proof requires multiple parties to participate. According to this view, when pledging ETH, each verifier reasonably expects to receive a pledge reward by relying on the efforts of other verifiers.


This argument is supported by low-level implementation details where the verifiers are split into committees under Ethereum's unique proof-of-pledge protocol.


More importantly, this argument misunderstands the mechanism of prover rewards in Ethereum's proof-of-interest implementation, and water down Howey's original standard of requiring "complete reliance on the efforts of others" to an unprecedented degree. As we explain below, Ethereum's provers work hand-in-hand with miners in the pre-merger proof-of-work network, not expecting a return from significant management efforts by other provers, but primarily from their own efforts and funding. To understand why this is the case, it is helpful to have a basic understanding of the rewards that a prover can earn in Ethereum's proof of interest network.


3BIi1. Verifier Rewards in the Ethereum Proof of Interest network


There are many factors that can affect the calculation of a verifier's reward. In Ethereum's proof-of-pledge implementation, the prover receives rewards every other epoch (6.4 minutes), which are calculated as multiples of the "basic reward". 36 The base reward itself is determined by the number of active verifiers on the network (the "total active pledge") and dynamically adjusted to motivate an ideal-sized set of verifiers.


The verifier can do this by proving (or accurately voting on) (i) the correct source; (ii) the right objectives; (iii) correct block headers (collectively referred to as the "Accuracy reward"), and (iv) inclusion of their proof (their vote) into the block (the "Inclusion reward") to earn a multiple of the basic reward. The inclusion reward is also split between the prover and the verifier, and the verifier is randomly selected to produce a block.


According to the researchers, assuming a fixed base reward over time, a verifier's profit is primarily determined by the ETH balance that the verifier deposits in the network, which is capped at 32ETH. 40


3bii2. The verifier expects a pledge reward from his own actions, not from the "efforts of others."


Analyzing the economic reality of pledging ETH, the court should find it inconsistent with the "efforts of others" doctrine in Howey. The return on a pledge is determined primarily by the individual efforts of the verifier and is not dependent on any management effort by a third party. As mentioned above, the verifier's return is primarily determined by the number of ETH they bet and the chance they get to randomly propose blocks, both of which are experiential proof specific and not dependent on any third party.


In other words, the verifier retains the ability to control the profit from its investment. Applying Schaden test, 43 the control power of the verifier is firstly reflected in the lack of information asymmetry; Rewards are distributed based on open source protocols and transactions recorded on the public blockchain. The reward is also determined based on the time and effort contribution of the verifier, as the verifier must maximize their uptime and stay connected to the network to avoid being cut.


Although the verifier can sometimes be incentive to let other verifier to join the network (for example, when it will lead to increased basic rewards), and depend on other verifier of action to maximize reward (for example, proved that the spread of requirement), but the verifier has never been as Howey by relying on skilled and judgment "entrepreneurs" or "management".


4. Conclusion


As noted above, analyzing the economic reality of pledging ETH on Ethereum's proof-of-interest network, the court should find that the pledge fails to satisfy the Howey test because there is no "common enterprise" and the verifier has never relied on "the efforts of others." Although not the focus of this article, there are also questions about whether depositing ETH for pledge qualifies as "investment of funds". And again, failure to comply with any one of the Howey four principles means that the transaction is not an investment contract and therefore not a security transaction.


But in addition to legal analysis, applying the strict requirements stipulated by the securities laws of the United States to pledge will lead to the maladaptation and absurd application of the law. As we have argued, one of the raison d 's of securities regulation is to ameliorate the problem of asymmetric information between sponsors and investors through disclosure. Thus, treating the pledge of ETH as an investment contract would result in imposing disclosure obligations on the "issuer" or "sponsor".


As we said above, there is no identifiable issuer or originator at the time of pledging ETH. However, if we accept the premise that the verifier plays the role of sponsor or issuer, then the obvious irrationality of participating in registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements becomes apparent. Will the Securities law force the verifier to provide information to the other party? What material information will the verifier be required to disclose? How will this help mitigate any information asymmetries, and how will it serve the public interest? The impracticality of answering these questions illustrates the flawed logic of applying securities law to verifiers: they do not pose the risk that disclosure is intended to address.


About the author


Rodrigo Seira is cryptocurrency counsel at Paradigm.

Amy Aixi Zhang is a policy adviser at Paradigm.

Jake Chervinsky is Director of policy at the Blockchain Association, an adviser to Variant Fund, and a board member of DeFi Education Fund.


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