Curve War Escalates the CVX battle, and the fascinating power struggle continues

原文作者：0x137，@ 律动 BlockBeats

早在 2020 年 8 月就爆发的 Curve War 在过去很长一段时间里始终没获得足够的关注，但随着 Convex 的出现，形势出现了极大变化，各大协议也开始争夺 CVX 的话语权。战争的火药味越发浓烈，而 CRV、CVX、YFI 在过去一个月内也展示出了强劲的表现。为什么会有 Curve War？它的主要参与者有哪些？谁是最大的赢家？

为什么会有 Curve War？

Curve 作为一家专注于低滑点的算稳 AMM，通过发行治理 Token CRV 作为提供流动性的激励，从而提高 Curve 平台各算稳池的流动性深度，并保持算稳的挂钩能力。仅从这一层面看，Curve 似乎和其他依靠流动性挖矿的 DeFi 1.0 协议没有区别。

但 Curve 有一个非常关键的机制，使它和传统流动性挖矿有着极大的不同：通过锁定 CRV，流动性提供者（LP）可以对应地获得 veCRV，它对 Curve 平台的流动性激励幅度有着实际的治理意义，拥有着改变「衡量权重」（Gauge Weights）的权力。

In other words, the liquidity incentive of each mining pool on Curve platform will be determined by its veCRV voting rights. The more veCRV holders vote for it, the higher its liquidity incentive will be. In this way, CRV becomes an important part of the benefits provided by other protocols for their stakeholders. In order to improve their APY/APR, these protocols have to accumulate veCRV in various ways to compete for the hill of Curve liquidity incentive, and the protracted Curve War ensues.

Curve War was technically a mercenary War. VeCRV holders cannot simply vote for a particular mining pool; to do so, the agreement must offer them an attractive enough bribe. For example, if you vote for the MIM (Abracadabra platform Stablecoin) mining pool, you can get the corresponding SPELL Token (Abracadabra native Token). In the latest round of Votium voting, abracadabra's "total bribery" even reached $969,000. However, in the anxious War, the warring parties were still developing new strategies to accumulate veCRV, and Curve War also entered the white-hot stage. Curve War's early history can be found inA Power Struggle over CurveA detailed introduction is given in the article. In fact, the war did not attract enough attention at the beginning. Major participants such as Yearn Finance and Stake DAO sold CRV in the market after obtaining the incentives, driving down the price of CRV and reducing the attractiveness of the incentive mechanism to a large extent. But after Convex, everything changes.

Convex：我雇佣的雇佣，还是我的雇佣

Convex 是专为优化 Curve 利率而打造的 DeFi 协议，旨在尽可能多地锁仓 CRV Token。CRV 持有者可以在 Convex 上永久质押他们的代币，并换取等额的 cvxCRV 作为流动性，不仅可以享受与 veCRV 持有者相同的 CRV 激励，还能获得额外的 CVX 作为奖励。而 Convex 从中得到的好处，就是从 veCRV 持有者手中换来了完全自主的 CRV 治理权。

In just a few months, Convex successfully accumulated enough CRVS and was able to effectively decide the incentive allocation of the mining pool on Curve, thus winning the first battle of Curve War. But for Convex, it was much more than simply controlling CRV, and it was clearly important to address the source of value for its governance Token.

于是 Convex 如法炮制 Curve，做了一个套娃机制：CVX 是 Convex 平台的治理代币，通过锁定 CVX 可以让 LP 对 Convex 的 veCRV 治理决策进行投票，也就是说，控制了 Convex 就等同于控制了 Curve。

更为精妙的是，按照当前比率计算，协议通过一美元 CVX 所购买到的 CRV 衡量权重，甚至比直接购买 CRV 还要多。在上一轮 Votium 投票中，协议每向 vlCVX 持有者支付 1 美元，自己在 Curve 平台的矿池就能获得 4.15 美元的 CRV。这样一来，对于 CVX 的需求就有了明显的上升，当前已经有 1.42 亿个 cvxCRV 和 2300 万个 CVX 被锁定，CVX 的价值也在不断稳步上升。

除此之外，Convex 的 Token 解锁时间表也是由 CRV 锁仓量决定的。当 CRV 锁仓达到 5 亿时，CVX 1 亿的流通循环将全部解锁，而平台在 CVX 排放结束后获得的每个边际 CRV 都会提高 CVX 对 CRV 的比率，这就意味着每一个 CVX 对 Curve 平台流动性激励的衡量权重都会增加。

Convex War

Now, in a bid to more effectively vie for control of Curve incentives, the protocols are engaged in a new mini-war at Convex. On this chemix, FRAX, Tribe, and Luna stablecoin protocols, there are two ways to obtain a higher CRV incentive quota. One is to "bribe" CVX holders, and the other is to accumulate and lock in CVX themselves. Since one CVX actually controls multiple VecRVs, purchasing CVX directly is the best option for the protocol. The problem is that less than 4% of CVX is now available for purchase on exchanges (less than 4 million CVX), and the number of protocols needed to accumulate far exceeds the number circulating in the market. To this end, the agreement is also to do their best to accumulate CVX in their coffers.

Yearn Finance

Yearn 金库同样依靠为 Curve 矿池提供流动性以获得 CRV 奖励，但只有 10% 的 CRV 奖励会被 Yearn 锁在后台用于购买更多 CRV，剩下的 90% 全被用于奖励提供支持的 LP。很显然，这让 Yearn 在 Curve War 中输给了 Convex。如今，Yearn 已将他们所有的 veCRV 都委托给了 Convex，以期提高自己工厂池的产量。当然需要注意的是，该委托并不会将 Yearn 自己的投票权委托给 Convex。

Olympus

Olympus 团队也是很早意识到了 Curve 重要的战略意义。团队也希望利用 Curve 投票权来提高 OHM 国库资产的收益率，并实现对 Curve 生态系统的重要治理。在其治理提案 OIP-43 中，团队提议通过发行 CVX 债券，以增加 Olympus 金库中 CVX 的持仓量。在 Olympus 团队看来，成为使用 CVX 的先行者是一个巨大的优势：CVX 排放率会随着时间的推移而降低，这会使未来获取和当前控制权同等的 CVX 变得更加困难且昂贵。现在，Olympus DAO 已经拥有超 317,000 枚 CVX，价值 690 万美元。

其他算稳协议

Stable protocols such as Abracadabra, Frax, and Alchemix offer more of a "bribe" to CVX holders. In the past round of Votium voting, these projects topped the list: Abracadabra and Frax paid holders $2.23 million and $970,000, respectively, while Alchemix shared a "bribe payment" of $1.3 million between alETH and alUSD stabilization pools. In addition, nearly 705,000 CVX are locked in contract addresses associated with the Frax development team; Abracadabra has also decided to spend 5% of the weekly agreement fee to buy and lock in CVX.

Poacher Mochi Inu

必须承认，战争就是尔虞我诈，必然会有不守规则、趁火打劫的参与者。就在去年 11 月，Curve Emergency DAO 就发现一个叫 Mochi Inu 的协议在对 Curve 进行「治理攻击」，并火速出击，切断了相关矿池及其 CRV 激励。

在将 USDM 推广为「有背书」的稳定币并加入 Curve 矿池后，Mochi Inu 利用其无限量的 Mochi Token 凭空铸造了 4600 万美元的 USDM，并用这些 USDM 耗尽了 DAI 的 USDM-3 池，通过所得利润购买了大量的 CVX。其意图其实很明显，就是想控制大量 CVX，通过提高 CRV 激励以扩大 USDM-3 池，从而产生飞轮效应（Flywheel Effect）。但最终由于 USDM 的抵押品严重不足，USDM 挂钩失败，给投资者造成了重大损失。

Mochi 至今仍然控制着大约 100 万枚 CVX 代币，虽然 Convex DAO 取消了 Mochi 的投票权，但 Mochi 未来仍能通过 cvxCRV 奖励的形式获得可观的收入。毫无疑问，这种行为违背了 Curve 权力下放的初衷，也暴露了 Curve 当前的问题。在很多人看来，Curve 向来都是新算稳的保护伞，没有 Curve 很多协议都难以为自己打开局面，但也正是因为 Curve 的这个角色，让他成为了一些协议挖墙脚的对象。未来 Curve 生态想要做强做稳，就必须解决这个问题。

护城河还是特洛伊马？

Unlike real-world battlefields, blockchains have infinite space, so why do other protocols siege Curve's walls when they can build their own castles? The answer is simple -- they can't build a solid moat. It's pulsatingVariant Fund Co-founder: How to Make Web3 Applications Defensive?一文中也有更深入的阐释。相比之下，Curve 依靠其独特的 AMM 结构和庞大的流动性，能够打造足够坚实的应用壁垒。此外，巨鲸们被为了获得更大的投票权，也会选择更长久的 CRV 锁定时间，就目前而言，CRV 的投票锁定期为 3.65 年。Curve 的这些优势都是其他协议难以复制的，目前没有任何一个 Curve 分叉能与其竞争就是最好的证据。

Curve has become a critical piece of infrastructure in DeFi today, and the protocol wars surrounding it are getting more attention. Admittedly, by controlling a large number of VECRVs, Convex has made a great contribution to the ecological development of Curve in the process. But because of this, the original Curve War seems to have become the Convex War, and CVX has become the most important and popular role in the Curve War. Large protocols like BadgerDAO, Abracadabra, And OlympusDAO are accumulating CVX to seek to control CRV incentives. From this basic perspective, CVX has a higher value proposition than CRV itself: With the gradual reduction of CVX emissions, the inherent value of CVX as a "voting controller" also increases, which also promotes the protocol introduction to compete for control of Curve incentive through CVX, while CRV itself is to some extent elevated. This makes us wonder whether Convex is a moat or a Trojan horse for Curve. Who are the real winners in this war?

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