Article title: "the inspiration of stable currency -- building a new loan buffer model"
First class
Decentralised stabilisation COINS seem contradictory: while their aim is to create unregulated assets, they can only achieve full stability by adding irrelevant assets (centralised/regulated assets, such as Maker's recent addition of USDC as collateral). In fact, the problem is more widespread in synthetic assets and cross-chain assets. We have developed another market-based mechanism to enhance the stability of assets in a crisis while ensuring that there is no regulation. This creates a buffer between those willing to swap their stability currency for regulated assets in a crisis (in exchange for continued gains for option buyers) and those who want to be completely decentralised.

ETH historical price: on March 12, 2020 (black Thursday), etherefang prices almost halved, triggering a massive liquidation by DeFi and CeFi (chart :OnChainFx).& have spent & have spent
background
On March 12, 2020, covid-19 caused panic in the market and ushered in "black Thursday", when cryptocurrency prices plunged by about 50%. This has led to massive clearing of major cryptocurrency leverage platforms, including centralized platforms such as trading platforms and new decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms that facilitate excess mortgages on the chain. On an unusual day, Maker stabler Dai was also caught in a deflationary clearing spiral. This led to high volatility in "stable" assets and a breakdown in the collateral clearing process. Some collateral is being liquidated at prices close to zero as congestion exacerbates a lack of liquidity in the market. As a result, the system ran short of collateral, prompting an emergency response from the project side, which had to be recapitalised by selling new tokens similar to shares.

& have spent Dai historical prices, note the high volatility curve from March 12, 2020 (chart :OnChainFx). & have spent & have spent
During this time, the demand for Dai has increased. It became a riskier, more volatile asset, but it traded at a high premium, with lending rates in the double digits. Leveraged speculators must buy back Dai in order to deleverage, which depletes Dai's liquidity and pushes up Dai's price, thus increasing future clearing costs (we will discuss some of the deeper causes of illiquidity in the market in the second half). These speculators are beginning to realise that, in such circumstances, they face the risk that $1 of debt relief could carry a huge premium. Eventually a new externally stable asset-the USDC, the regulatory stability currency anchored in dollars-must be injected as a new kind of collateral to stabilise the system.

Dai's historical loan rates, note the double-digit rates from 12 March 2020 (chart: LoanScan). & have spent & have spent
In addition to the COVID 19 scare, bitUSD, bitBTC, Steem Dollars and NuBits also suffered major decoupling events in 2018.
Stability result
In this paper, we model the incentives of stable currency speculators (CDP owners) such as Dai to resolve crises such as black Thursday. These speculators determine the supply of stable currency by optimising the profitability of leveraged positions, combined with expectations of future collateral clearing costs.
Explanation of stable currency and unstable region: in the stable region, the stable currency performs well, and the price probability of the stable currency is consistent with that of the anchor currency, with little fluctuation. Outside the stable area, the stable currency may not be stable and the price fluctuation is obviously large, which may be similar to ETH fluctuation level.
This instability is triggered by a number of factors: large underlying price fluctuations, the ETH crash, liquidity problems caused by deleveraging in a crisis (which can lead to a deflationary deleveraging spiral). To liquidate CDP, speculators need to buy back the stability currency to repay their debts. If speculators want to deleverage a lot, neither the marginal speculators who want to increase leverage and issue a new stability currency, nor the holders of the stability currency who want to sell their stability currency, can find a balance point, and the speculators will eventually drive up the price of the stability currency. Essentially, in this case, as black Thursday shows, speculators need to pay a premium for deleveraging.

Above is an intuitive explanation of the deleveraging spiral. To deleverage, when market liquidity dries up, CDP holders need to buy back their stabilisers at rising prices. & have spent& have spent
These triggers are how things actually work in cryptocurrency Settings. They proved to be relatively likely events over a long period of time. Therefore, we can neither ignore them nor expect them to change, we must adjust ourselves to them. We can focus on expanding the scope of stability. The size of the stability zone depends on the precise market structure. In an ideal (unrealistic) setting, money is stable over a large area. The important thing, however, is that even in an ideal environment, a price crash worsens. So there are not many speculators who want to issue stability currency because it relates to risky positions that they think are not profitable.
Our analysis results may be more applicable to data-driven stability currency risk tools, for example, estimating the probability of disconnection and inferring when to cross the barrier and leave the stability zone. But there is an obvious caveat: specific numerical results can be highly model-dependent and sensitive to market structure and the distribution of underlying assets. Our focus is on resolving these systems and how to mitigate the crisis.
One solution: integration with regulatory assets
Deleveraging brings fundamental trade-offs to decentralized design. One way to bring a stability currency closer to a "perfect" stability is to increase the degree to which demand ADAPTS to supply (elasticity).
The medium - to long-term elasticity depends on unrelated alternatives to stable currencies. Since all non-regulated stable currencies are likely to face similar deleveraging risks, greater flexibility depends on the exchangeability of the regulated stable currency or the fiat currency. Even if long-term demand is elastic in principle, the short term can be tricky. Much of the supply of stable money is locked up in other applications, such as loan agreements and lotteries. These applications (in a sense) secure the value of the overcollaterals, but not the liquidity of the withdrawals. In addition, ethereum transactions cannot be executed in parallel. During periods of market volatility, transactions may be delayed due to network congestion, leading to immediate trading failures (especially moving to or from a centralized trading platform). This would happen even if these markets were liquid in principle.
Another way to bring stability closer to "perfect" stability is to increase the number of marginal speculators willing to use leverage and issue more stability. Since there are not countless speculators with high expectations for ETH (especially during a long bear market), this relies on holding other mortgage assets. Since all decentralized assets are highly correlated, this also relies heavily on holding regulated mortgage assets, such as the USDC recently added by Maker. Note, of course, that regulatory assets carry risks of their own and may not be associated with extreme crises. Such as counterparty risk, bank operation risk, asset seizure risk and the impact of negative interest rates. But there may also be some substantial diversification potential.

Dai adds a new USDC as collateral;& have spent
While these measures of integration with regulatory assets can enhance stability, they create greater centralisation and move the system away from a "non-regulatory" state. This seems to create a paradox: while the goal is to create unregulated assets, they can be fully stabilized only by adding unrelated assets (currently centralized/regulated).
Alternative: unregulated insurance pools
We propose an alternative: a buffer to curb deleveraging without directly consolidating regulatory assets. The buffer differentiates those willing to swap stability for regulatory assets in a crisis (for sustained gains for CDP holders) from those who want to achieve full decentralization.
The Maker system charges a fee to the speculator, and if the Dai holder locks Dai into the pool, the Dai holder gets part of the reward. By modifying the mechanism, this pool of savings can provide a buffer against deleveraging. If, for example, speculators were allowed to buy Dai in the savings pool at a reasonable premium and use it to deleverage, the deleveraging effect would be limited by a premium of up to the size of the savings buffer. Dai holders participating in the pool will be compensated for offering repurchase options to speculators. Dai holders can opt for buy-backs in mortgage assets or other assets, such as regulatory stabilisation. In this way, the mechanism can provide "perfect" stability Settings while allowing Dai holders to choose the degree of decentralization they want. Dai holders who do not need to be highly decentralized can be compensated from the pool, while Dai holders who need to be highly decentralized can be compensated from the pool. Our model can be extended to incorporate this mechanism.
The mechanism can be implemented in a manner similar to chai contracts. First, speculators have to pay a fee to subscribe to the vault. In return for the subscription, they can choose to buy back Dai. This option entitles them to receive Dai in a crisis to repay Dai borrowed from the vault. Second, users can add Dai to this insurance pool. Dai in the pool earns interest on the Dai savings rate (when interest rates are again above 0%); The pool can also earn interest by offering short-term loans. In addition, users can also receive a second share of interest from the fees paid by the speculator. Fee assets include pools of assets provided by speculators, such as ETH, BAT, or USDC. The interest rate can be adjusted according to the market mechanism of the pool: in times of high demand for insurance and low supply, the cost can be high to encourage users to join. When demand is low, the cost will be adjusted accordingly. Notably, by executing the atomic function on the Maker contract, we can ensure that the Dai provided is only repurchased by the vault currently subscribed to the pool.
Extends to cryptographic assets other than stable currency
The model/results (and the resulting solutions) are more widely applied to synthetic and cross-chain assets and to overcollateralized loan agreements that allow the borrowing of illiquid and/or inelastic assets, as long as the mechanism is based on leveraged positions and forms the endogenous price of the assets created or borrowed. Synthetic assets typically use a similar mechanism, with different anchoring goals. The migration of assets from blockchains (such as bitcoin) without smart contract functionality to cross-chain assets (such as ethereum) with smart contract functionality also tends to rely on a similar mechanism. In decentralized (or, more accurately, hosted on a dependency chain) structures such as XClaim and tBTC, the vault operator locks up the ETH collateral in addition to the deliverable BTC assets. They face the risk of a leveraged ETH/BTC exchange rate and a similar risk of deleveraging. In particular, to reduce risk, they need to buy back cross-chain assets on ethereum.
conclusion
We built new modeling tools for stability COINS and other mortgage cryptographic assets and demonstrated their value in understanding and preventing crises. We have developed a market mechanism that can both enhance the stability of assets in a crisis and ensure that there is no regulation. This creates a buffer between those willing to swap their stability currency for regulated assets in a crisis (in exchange for continued gains for option buyers) and those who need to be completely decentralised. Once constructed, the long-term stability and viability of the unsupervised stable currency will be improved.
Original link:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/
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