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Why did financial analysts miss red flags on SVBS?

Read this article in 7 Minutes
If we're going to stop the crypto bloodbath, we need TradFi to put on the DeFi lens.
Why Financial Analysts Missed Silvergate's Red Flags
Original article by Brett Harrison
Colin, SevenUpDAO


Silvergate Corp. (SI) is a publicly traded company with at least 10 sell-side research and financial analysts. These analysts evaluate Silvergate (and other regional banks) and make recommendations on the company's stock or debt (e.g., buy, sell, hold).


On a personal note, these analysts continue to recommend SI, even in the FTX  The same is true after news of the cryptocurrency trading platform crash. On November 9, for example, Canaccord analyst Joe Vafi wrote, "If FTX ceases operations or some clients migrate to other trading platforms, Silvergate will likely still receive this volume within its operating range." Vafi has a buy rating and a $150 price target on Silvergate. Silvergate closed at $34.69 on Nov. 9 and hasn't traded that high since.


It was only after the many damning events that followed -- a letter from members of Congress to Silvergate Bank, its $4.3 billion loan from the Federal Home Loan Bank, news of the Justice Department investigation, a joint statement from bank regulators about crypto asset risks called "Banking Organizations," Silvergate will delay its notice of filing its annual report, which questions its own ability to be a "going concern" and the exodus of many of the bank's key partners - analysts who eventually caved in. But even that is not entirely true, with some downgrading Silvergate from buy to hold.


This change of heart is too little too late. The damage is done. On March 8th Silvergate announced that its bank would cease operations and go into voluntary liquidation.


I believe Silvergate had fundamental problems long before November that traditional analysts had failed to spot or at least grossly underestimated. Why?


Sell-side financial analysts follow a well-worn path. They earned undergraduate degrees in finance, economics, mathematics, etc. They hold entry-level positions as senior analysts. Perhaps earn a CFA, Series 7, or MBA and become an expert in a specific sector or sub-sector (for example, regional banking).


This path provides them with a lens of traditional finance (TradFi) and gives them a blind spot in decentralized finance (DeFi), causing them to miss the bank's cryptocurrency-related troubles.


(This is also true for analysts at traditional rating agencies, who have been slow to downgrade Silvergate.)


In Silvergate's case, they missed several red lights.


Are there any professionals?


For most of its life, Silvergate was a sleepy Southern California regional bank offering a traditional suite of personal and commercial banking services. In 2016, it switched and went all in on cryptocurrencies, transforming into a bank that calls itself a "non-traditional bank."


In its 2019 regulatory filing, Silvergate expanded on this, saying its "business model and vision are different from traditional banks." In addition to its traditional banking services, it is "a leader in providing specialized commercial banking products and services to emerging financial technology  (" fintech") companies in the United States and beyond."


The analyst's optimistic advice lent Silvergate a veneer of institutional legitimacy.


However, this structural shift in the business model has not been supported by crypto-related acquisitions or meaningful capital investments, raising questions about whether Silvergate has the staff and business to run crypto banking.


Trading network


Silvergate's flagship "specialty merchant banking product" is the Silvergate Exchange Network (  SEN ) , which CoinDesk describes as "a 24/7 instant settlement network used by some of the largest trading entities in the space. SEN, it replaces clunky wire transfer transactions by allowing businesses to instantly transfer dollars between cryptocurrency trading platforms including evenings and weekends..." The company shut down SEN on March 3 and removed the page describing the service from its website.


Building on SEN's success, Silvergate then offered SEN leverage, a custom loan that "allows institutional clients to trade any asset on the platform using leverage secured by bitcoin or US dollars", "Near real-time loan payment and repayment network (SEN) via Silvergate transaction platform." That service was also shut down on March 3.


While these services may represent a paradigm shift, they are also services that no other federally insured bank can offer. In addition, Silvergate's CEO Alan Lane admitted in a 2021 interview that SEN Leverage was not approved by bank regulators: "It's not like an approved product, it's an unapproved product, and that's one of the ways we talk about it in the banking community."


Moreover, these services directly link Silvergate's growth to the volatility and vagaries of the crypto market. Any prediction of Silvergate's future value requires a deep understanding of these markets and the use cases that are still unfolding.


Money laundering control


SEN is key to Silvergate's customer acquisition strategy. The strategy worked. Silvergate's customer base has grown from 20 cryptocurrency customers in 2016 to 1 in 2022. More than 600. These clients include hedge funds,   More than 100 domestic and foreign cryptocurrency trading platforms as well as companies engaged in Token projects.


Importantly, customer deposits are predominantly digital assets, which are not a particularly secure or stable source of funding, as they directly expose Silvergate to non-traditional risks, particularly volatility in crypto markets. Silvergate exacerbates these risks by offering loans to customers facing the same encryption-related issues. As one investor told me, "It all seems like a disaster if cryptocurrency prices go down." They did fall.


Also, consider that these clients use SEN to facilitate "over $1 trillion in payments since inception in 2017" (highlighted in the original 2022 Silvergate investor presentation).


It is incredible that a mid-sized bank, even one with "twice as many compliance staff as a bank of the same size," is able to carry out the necessary anti-money laundering checks to detect and stop suspicious activity. So many customers and so many real-time currency transactions. The volume and speed of these transactions - the source of many analysts' reassuring predictions - overwhelmed Silvergate's compliance organization.


Some customers realized this weakness and used SEN for illegal purposes. FTX and sister companies, according to court documents. Alameda Research  Taking advantage of the loose nature of the Silvergate compliance scheme, accounts were created for the seemingly fictitious subsidiary (Northern Electronics) to hide funds intended for Alameda's trading activities.


However, even before the FTX debacle, there was evidence that customers were using SEN for illegal purposes as early as July 2021, and specifically for money laundering in August 2022.


A report in New York Magazine Intelligencer on Jan. 24 offered a sweeping indictment of this nefarious activity, describing Silvergate as "the bank of choice for more than a dozen crypto companies that ended up being investigated, shut down, fined or bankrupt." The story identifies a number of clients who have run afoul of the law (e.g., convicted Australian cryptocurrency Ponzi scheme artist Stefan He Qin and Bittrex, a cryptocurrency trading platform and one-time Silvergate shareholder and customer, Has been sanctioned by U.S. authorities for transferring money on behalf of Iran and Syria).


Other investors and researchers are keenly aware of Silvergate's problems and share their views publicly (for example, veteran short seller Marc Cohodes told The  Block, "Silvergate is a publicly traded crime scene, and Alan Lane belongs in prison"), and so even sent letters to Silvergate's auditors and regulators describing the problems and urging them to take action.


The apparent inability of analysts to understand and assess the mismatch between management skills and new business models, the banks' large cryptocurrency-related balance sheet risks, potential regulatory risks from offering "unapproved" products and services, and anti-money laundering risks had serious consequences. In addition to allowing some Silvergate customers to engage in fraud and other unethical activities that hurt millions of people, the analyst's optimistic advice gives Silvergate a veneer of institutional legitimacy.


Some were quick to point out Silvergate as a banking failure, not a cryptocurrency failure. But I think this is another failure of TradFi: like a lender who has failed to invest. Celsius  Network and FTX institutional investors, Silvergate analysts used traditional investment techniques and metrics to assess the value of non-traditional companies, causing them to miss the embedded crypto risk that ultimately led to the company's failure. If we're going to stop the crypto bloodbath, we need TradFi to put on the DeFi lens.


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