原文标题:《 A Novel Framework for Reputation-Based Systems 》
原文作者: Jad Esber & Scott Kominers,a16z
原文编译: 谷昱,链捕手
Reputation systems provide an opportunity for platforms to identify and motivate high-quality contributions from participants, including content creation, moderation, community building, and gameplay. This is critical to the growth and sustainability of any Web3 project. However, the design of reputation system requires complex consideration around reputation supply, distribution, credibility, etc.
So while many people are exploring this space -- from DAOs like FWB to new social platforms like Axie Infinity earning games and BitClout -- builders have yet to agree on the best way to design these reputation systems.
Drawing on our knowledge of economic theory and game design, we argue that the design of a reputation system based on two tokens can serve as a tangible representation of meaningful contributions, with one used to represent reputation and the other to provide liquidity.
The basic premise behind the reputation system is not new. Since the beginning of civilization, we have invented tokens of reputation, such as badges for merit or service. In the corporate world, employees are assigned titles or ranks to indicate their place in the hierarchy -- the "markers" that often determine a person's salary and other benefits.
Games have also long been pioneers of digital reputation systems. "Points" accumulated during the game can be converted into in-game "currency", which can be used to buy new skins, weapons, characters, etc.
总的来说,加密世界中的声誉 Token 采取了社交 Token 的形式。这些 Token 可以由各种实体(包括人和社区以及游戏和应用程序)发行,可用于获取社会资本、获取服务和/或转化为奖励(财务或其他方式)。
重要的是,在加密环境中,社交 Token 通常可以代表所有权和唯一性(在 NFT 的情况下),并且由于区块链的存在,社交 Token 是去中心化的和可移植的,因此社交 Token 可以在全球互联网经济中使用,而不仅仅是在受单一平台或决策者的限制。
数字平台上的声誉 Token 通常有两个目的:
· Identify and reward users who contribute value to the platform -- a form of signal that these users can use to enhance their public reputation.
· Provide a form of compensation that enables contributors to liquefy some of the value they create into convertible currency.
然而这两个角色却是对立的。 Token 需要可交换才能具有流动性。但是 Token 的流动性越高,它作为纯粹的声誉信号的效果就越差。
为了说明这一点,假设声誉 Token 可以自由转让。如果 Token 作为信誉质量的可信信号,那么它们的交易价值就会很高,从而使持有者愿意交易它们。但是一旦 Token 开始交易,所有权就失去了其信号价值,破坏了 Token 名义上传达的声誉资本。
For example, charities could start minting NFT to reward those who complete more than 500 hours of community service. But if these recipients can sell their NFT to whomever they want, then whenever you encounter a holder, you must wonder: "Did that person get their NFT or buy it?"
即使没有人公开交易他们的社区服务 NFT,私人出售的可能性也会降低信号价值。在此类 Token 的完全流动性市场中,信号价值完全消失。
这就出现了一个悖论:如果一个 Token 可以很容易地转移,那么那些没有声誉的人就可以简单地购买它,这降低了 Token 作为声誉信号的能力。
Remember how easy it was to buy followers on Instagram? This makes followers a much weaker measure of reputation, so much so that brands are looking for engagement metrics that are harder to "buy".
也就是说,高价也会降低可转让性。例如,现在购买 CryptoPunk 非常昂贵,几乎所有持有者都必须提前购买。这似乎消除了悖论——恢复 Token 的声誉价值——但由于有些人愿意以高昂的价格购买 CryptoPunks 以获得声誉的外观,信号价值可能仍然会降低。目前,进入空间的人数也有一个自然边界。当更多人接受加密技术时,想象一下这个问题的规模。
此外,与 Token 相关的声誉资本的下降可以反馈到 Token 的市场价值中。如果 Token 失去了表明声誉的能力,那么人们对交易它的兴趣就会降低。事实上,随着人们开始大量购买 Instagram 粉丝,这些粉丝失去了他们的信号价值,这使得他们对影响者的购买兴趣降低。
使声誉 Token 可转让不仅会降低其作为声誉信号的能力,还会削弱其作为有价值补偿的能力。因此,建立声誉资本需要完全(或至少大部分)不可转让的 Token 。那么,问题是如何将声誉转化为流动性。
Token 在被可信来源(如品牌、大学或政府)授予时具有信号价值。但在加密和区块链环境中,不一定有中心化的第三方来源授予该权限。
因此,如果某人具有某些潜在特征,则传达价值的第二条途径是使 Token 更容易获得。例如,如果你真的很熟练或非常努力,那么在电子游戏中获得高分就容易得多;因此,高分标志着技能和努力的某种混合。YouTube 等平台上的高观看次数同样具有启发意义。
上述悖论——更容易转让,更少的信号传递能力——之所以出现,是因为使声誉 Token 可转让使它们与作为信号价值来源的基础机构和/或努力脱钩。
那么,如果我们将可转移性与 Token 本身分开呢?这就是为什么许多游戏已经将分数或积分与 Token 分开。很容易想象如何花费你的「分数」会适得其反。
我们提出了一个双 Token 声誉系统,其中一个 Token ,我们称之为积分,作为不可转让的声誉信号。第二个 Token 是一种可转让的资产,定期分配给积分持有者。实际上,积分以可用作可交易货币的形式分拆股息。此外,由于 Token 是由积分持有者累积的,因此 Token 也与潜在的声誉有关。
在较高的层面上,这种设计促进了一个反馈循环,用户可以从平台上的高质量贡献(例如贡献内容、审核或赢得游戏玩法)中获得积分。然后,当有积分的用户收到 Token 时,它们可以作为货币进行交易。用户对 Token 的需求推动了获得积分的需求,这反过来又激励了高质量的贡献。
请注意,虽然我们使用积分作为不可替代的语言和 Token 作为可替代的语言,但精确的实现可能因应用程序而异。关键是贡献者会收到一个不可交易的 Token ,该 Token 会衍生出可交易的 Token 。
In order for points to retain signal value and incentivize high-quality participation, they must somehow be linked to user contributions. In the context of a game, points may simply be awarded algorithmically as a function of performance. On creator platforms like YouTube or TikTok, points can be a direct function of how people interact with content from a particular creator. In other cases, such as a publishing platform like Mirror, there may be a set of users who are given the ability to award points, or a governance/voting process that determines the allocation of points.
It is important that points reliably link their holders to the source (or driver) of reputation. In addition, the reward points rate needs to be well understood as a function of contribution, so users can understand how much effort they need to put in to achieve a given point level. In other words: participants need to know the rules of the game before they start playing.
In many cases, points need not be scarce. For example, Discord has no upper limit on the number of badges it can award to moderators. However, scarcity can enhance or enhance the reputational value of a system. For example, the role of "moderator" on the Discord server is granted to only a few people, so someone with a moderator badge is seen as having a higher reputation on the server. If the server starts having too many people as facilitators at once, the perceived meaning and value of the character decreases.
为了创造一种与声誉相关的流动价值, Token 应该通过一系列红利累积给积分持有者,每个积分持有者根据他们拥有的积分数获得 Token。
There are three key issues in designing such a system:
每个红利的总规模——即每次发行红利时分配多少 Token ——取决于系统的宏观经济目标。
与积分不同,重要的是 Token 相对稀缺以赋予它们作为货币的价值。许多加密货币(例如 BTC)受益于 Token 供应的长期限制——它们中只有这么多可以铸造。在这种情况下,平均总股息必须随着时间的推移而减少,除非有某种机制可以将 Token 吸收回系统(例如通过平台内支付)。
即便如此——与一些标准直觉相反—— Token 供应不一定必须受到限制。例如,如果 Token 可以兑换为平台金库的一部分,那么总 Token 供应量可以随着金库的增长而扩大。在这些情况下,股息的总规模可能相同,甚至随着时间的推移而增长,只要股息间隔得足够远,不会超过金库的增长。
对于具有就业等参与功能的平台,如演出或创作者平台,最佳策略是定期向积分持有者分发 Token :例如每月,甚至每天。这意味着做出有价值贡献的用户,从而保持一定的积分水平,获得稳定的收入。
不经常或不定期安排的股息更适合那些贡献不那么规律的平台,如在某些 DAO 中。例如,当成员贡献文章或参与编码项目时,Forefront 会发行其 FF Token 。另一种选择是仅当平台参与度、生产力或资金超过阈值时才发行 Token 。这类似于上市公司的分红,我们在 Mirror 的 WRITE Token 空投案例中也看到了这一点。
也许将 Token 与积分联系起来的最简单方法是通过线性红利,即每个积分使用户有权获得每个红利的平等份额。但这不是唯一的选择。

At convex dividend rates, the share of each dividend is distributed disproportionately to users with more points. The bonus of the integral from 1 to 2 increases more than the bonus of the integral from 0 to 1. Convexity rewards users who participate in the system for a long time, providing more motivation to stay in state.

The opposite approach is to concave the dividend yield, where integrating from 0 to 1 is more valuable than integrating from 1 to 2. This approach is great for attracting new users because it rewards initial contributions more than late contributions, whether you're second, third, or 27th. That said, a dent system like this is harder to maintain if the user is anonymous, because in this case the user can create many accounts and earn early credits for each account.

三个红利设计特征——大小、供应和分配——决定了积分持有者在每个时间段收到的 Token 数量。这种关系直接影响获得积分的动机。
理想情况下,应该校准 Token 的分配,以便用户获取积分的边际回报对应于平台产生积分活动的边际收益。你如何看待这种边际收益取决于贡献创造平台价值的方式。换句话说,你应该根据你为平台创造的价值来赚取积分。
例如,在 YouTube 等平台上,分数将反映视频观看次数——该平台可以准确估计给定观看次数对平台参与度和底线的贡献程度。然后,平台应根据每个创作者的观点的边际价值向他们发行 Token 。在这里,凸红利可能是有道理的,因为头部 YouTubers 比不太受欢迎的人更能推动长期参与。
YouTube has gone through several iterations of this -- first linking spending to views, then to time spent, and most recently, to an engagement metric they've named "YouTube Time," which takes into account more than just time spent watching content on the platform.
YouTube constantly adjusts its payments. That creates revenue uncertainty for YouTube creators, who pay their bills through advertising. Ideally, the platform would make participants' contributions more transparent so that contributors could assess the value of earning points (and avoid frustration and burnout).
此外,边际收益=边际收益的原则意味着积分分配规则可能需要调整。这使该平台能够为早期贡献者提供不成比例的份额,与他们对系统贡献的重要性相称,但其贡献较少。也就是说,平台可能对贡献的价值没有明确的认识,尤其是在早期,因此需要有一种围绕 Token 分配进行实验和重新校准的机制。
积分和 Token 之间的联系提供了一种自然机制来奖励做出高质量贡献的用户。但由于积分不可转让,因此存在滞后因素:那些较早积累积分的人最终可能会获得不成比例的红利,尤其是在渐近 Token 供应量固定的情况下。
In many cryptography projects, the biggest holder turns out to be the first person to know about the project. But those early adopters are not necessarily the most valuable for the future of the ecosystem. It is therefore crucial to maintain incentives for continued contribution and participation.
在双 Token 框架中实现这一目标的一种自然方法是让积分随着时间的推移而降级或贬值。这可以通过减少作为用户积分年龄的函数的红利来实现。但更简单的实现是简单地让用户的总积分下降,无论是机械地随着时间的推移还是作为用户相对于其他人的参与度的函数。
Again, this is similar to what happens in the game: in absolute leaderboards, the points are zero-sum -- if players don't maintain their contributions, they will eventually lose their status when other players overtake them. The same is true on creators' platforms, where competition for consumer attention incentivizes continued engagement.
But even if the pool itself is growing, rather than zero-sum, there may be value in having points mechanically downgraded just to create incentives to participate. Clearly specifying how fast and why points decline can also be valuable, as it helps users optimize their contribution levels.
积分下降意味着 Token 红利就像股票红利随着时间的推移自动稀释,就像传统上市公司在需要新投资以增加价值时通过发行新股来稀释其股权一样。从这个意义上说,积分下降反映了用户对平台持续投资的需要。
当然,与任何货币系统一样, Token 的实际价值取决于社区对该价值的看法。这意味着积分的价值在很大程度上取决于 Token 的感知价值。因此,社区对 Token 价值的看法至少需要足够高,以支持分配的总 Token 。
这意味着该平台可能需要采取货币政策——可能通过回购或临时交易限制来调整总 Token 供应量。例如,在推出后的最初几周,BitClout 不允许将 BitClout 兑换成其他货币。
我们描述的双 Token 系统提供了一种简单的替代方法:调整积分累积率或股息流量。例如,管理游戏的委员会可以让游戏稍微困难一些,作为减缓积分积累的一种方式,或者可以减少总股息规模,作为减少长期 Token 供应的一种方式。
But the builder must be careful of these types of interventions because each change in the overall incentive structure of the contributor affects the contributor's behavior. In particular, any accidental lowering of the score value could damage user trust.
我们已经概述了社交 Token 设计的一些核心原则,但同样重要的是用产品市场契合度来补充这些设计,从而激发用户的内在动力。例如,一款专注于让用户获利但没有正确把握「玩」元素的游戏赚钱游戏就忽略了这一点:游戏首先应该是为了乐趣而玩。
Products that bootstrap around a reputation system but lack true product market fit have the potential to create a community of speculators rather than actual users.
But once product and market matching is achieved, incentives take over. If the platform does not reward users properly, it will be difficult for the platform to scale and achieve mass adoption. For incentives to work, reputation systems should separate social capital from financial capital, especially if the former provides a clear pathway to the latter.
这里还有很多需要考虑的问题,比如治理和声誉之间的关系;使声誉系统能够响应贡献者社区的发展;并使所有类型的贡献者都可以建立声誉。但我们相信,如果建设者在高层次上采用双 Token 系统设计,他们将能够用真实的声誉信号奖励贡献者,即使在产生流动性的同时也能保持其价值。这正是这些项目推动增长所需要的。
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