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How to beat the Ethereum scavenger, here are three solutions

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Never enter your original confidential information (private keys, Key Store files, and mnemonics) on an Internet-connected device or on any web page.

The original title: the introduction | how to defeat the etheric lane street sweeper, save your assets"

Original source: Harry Denley
Min Min & O sword


Have you ever sent a piece of money to an account, only to see it disappear? You may have been the victim of a scavenger. We're here to help you out.


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产


If your private keys are stolen, the perpetrator will usually arrange for a "scavenger" program to monitor your account and then look for an opportunity to eat the assets in your account -- whether you deposit ETH or other tokens in the account, receive airdrops, or anything similar.


This article Outlines how "scavengers" can eat up user assets and provides three ways to save funds (such as deposits) that have not yet been eaten.


How is the user's private key leaked?


We have recently seen a number of users impersonating administrators of Telegram groups and then offering "help" to users on the main channels of legitimate groups (although they are not real administrators, they copy the profiles of legitimate administrators with only slight changes to their usernames). Fake administrators often use jargon to confuse users by sharing links to websites that appear legitimate (because they are endorsed by the brand). These sites ask users to provide private keys or mnemonic words.


Then your token is gone, and a scavenger will start monitoring your account.


Here's an example of a phishing site:


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产

Thanks to researcher @Dubstard for spotting a lot of activities impersonating WalletConnect


How does "scavenger" work?


The scavenger is a piece of code that monitors the blockchain (including the trading pool, which technically isn't on the chain). It has a faster reaction time than humans, and is programmed to sign certain transactions that meet the rules.


In other words, the scavenger can't see you. It doesn't know that you're looking at your address on a blockchain browser, or "linking" your address to a user interface for a dApp. It sees your activity only when you sign a transaction and broadcast it to the network.


Over time, scavengers have evolved, along with phishing scams that use scavengers.


The evolution of "scavenger"

One type of scam that became popular in 2017 used tokens with a lock function (i.e., unable to successfully call a transfer()) and a feed price. Dave Appleton's post exposes these scams.


In such scams, the fraudster gets the lockable tokens first, but the block browser still provides the price of the tokens (the most popular of which is Minerum (MNE)). The scammer would then (as if by accident) publish the private key to the address containing such tokens, enticing the victim to retrieve the tokens from the address. In order to withdraw the token, the victim forwards the ETH to that address as a gas charge. However, the scammers had already arranged for "scavengers" to transfer the ETH to their own accounts with great speed. In theory, locked tokens are considered worthless, so scammers try to recover some of the lockup value from unsuspecting greedy users.


Today, hacked addresses have been widely populated with basic ETH "scavengers". There are also scams using more logically advanced "scavengers" who will eat the ERC 20 tokens based on the feeding price.


Some time ago, I did research on a hacked address and found that these scavengers continue to evolve:


1) Scavengers like to eat high-value assets, even if it means paying more transaction fees.


2) The "scavenger" will use all the available ETH to steal as much value as possible, with a high probability of winning on the same nonce.


3) The scavenger has a matching engine that matches its native tokens with pledged tokens (i.e., XKNCA = KNC) in order to get the feed of pledged tokens.


4) The "scavenger" has its own internal nonce counter, which will be periodically reset to if its highest nonce is not recognized (or discarded/replaced) in a certain period of time

eth.getTransactionCount()

The output.


5) We can see from some on-chain activities that if a certain high-value asset becomes the prey of the scavengers, the scavengers will even transfer some ETH to the relevant account as gas fee in order to quickly transfer the asset out of the account.


6) Some scavengers set a minimum threshold for asset value. The scavenger will not eat assets below this threshold. This means that you may not be aware that there is a scavenger in your account. Reflect and fear.


Given that we first wrote about "scavengers" in 2017, today's "scavengers" are a long way from what they used to be, helping operators maximize gains while maximizing losses for victims.


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产


Stop it! Scavenger!


How to defeat a scavenger?

First of all, as a human, you can't code fast enough, so our solution will involve code. There are several different solutions for you, and while they are not 100% guaranteed to work, there is always one that is right for you.


You need to create a list (in order of priority) of tokens you want to save to make it easy to plan. This list needs to include the following:


The address of the token contract

Whether the token has been pledged (whether there is a time limit for unlocking it)

Whether tokens can be transferred

Token value (determined by the user's subjective judgment or dollar value for prioritization purposes)


Above all, you must be methodical so that you can execute the project quickly and effectively. As the wise saying goes, "Predictability makes the best of everything, unpreparedness makes the worst of everything."


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产


Use the Taichi Network


The scavenger works by monitoring transactions in a trading pool that send money to the address of the prey. This would allow the "clearers" to sign another transaction and broadcast it before it was confirmed, thereby withdrawing the transferred funds.


The Tai Chi network allows you to submit signed trades directly to the miners (i.e., the Spark Mine Pool) without having to broadcast them to the public trading pool. This means that your trade will be in the scavenger's blind spot, so it won't be jumped by the scavenger's robot (at least in my experience).


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产

Photo source: TAICHI.NET WORK


This is done by pre-signing all of your transactions in nonce order and programmatically submitting them to the Tai Chi network. Most scavengers only monitor Ethereum transactions waiting to be packaged in a public trading pool and do not call eth_getBalance for each new block (this is to save CPU cycles and RPC calls). In other words, the ETH sent to the prey account via the private exchange pool is invisible to the scavenger, so it will not be eaten.


You need to do some math to make sure that the ETH sent to the account as a gas fee is fully utilized on each signed transaction. If your calculations are accurate, Scavenger will probably miss the false start! (Normally, I would default to a gas charge a few percentage points higher than the "Rapid" reference on GasNow, increasing the probability that a transaction would be packaged into the next block.)


You can use MyCrypto to generate transaction signatures offline and send them to the Tai Chi network when ready, or write code to create signed transactions using ethers.js (or another code base).


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产


Use a smart contract with a self-destruct feature


This method is similar to using the Tai Chi network. We can use smart contracts to transfer ETH into accounts without exposing the transaction to the public trading pool. To do this, we could deploy the smart contract at a secure address and send the ETH via its constructor to the hacked address (this would be an internal transaction).


pragma sopdity > = 0.7.0 & lt; 0.9.0; contract MoveETH {    constructor(address sendToAddress) payable {        address payable addr = payable(address(sendToAddress));        selfdestruct(addr);    }}
'By deploying this contract, we can send the ETH and the hacked address string to the constructor's argument. The contract will create and self-destruct in the same transaction. Here, 'selfdestruct()' means that we will clear the blockchain state of the contract in the same transaction (hence the contract is a one-time deal) and send the ETH to the hacked address. `

Example:


https://goerp.etherscan.io/tx/0x82ccb222eae55aaea73dd0efee1ea6ed7320f880889f280d4a343b8823f86692


Note that this approach, while effective, adds additional cost as we do more than simply transfer ETH from one account to another. This method requires a cost of approximately 70,000 gas. When gas prices are high, the cost of gas alone is as high as 0.0112 ETH.


Next, we will broadcast pre-signed transactions from hacked addresses via the Taiji network (public nodes are also available here, please set the total ETH balance in your account to gas fee to avoid being jumped by the "cleaner" (at least minimize the possibility), because in this case, The scavenger must send more ETH to the hacked account to win the gas bid).


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产


Using Flashbots


In general, we need to pay ETH to get the transaction linked (because the transaction fee is paid by the sender of the transaction). However, with Flashbots, we can link transactions from external accounts without paying gas (or transaction fees) by simply "bribing" miners with funds from another account. In other words, we don't need to transfer a sum of ETH to the hacked address as a commission, we can take the token from this address. Yes, that's it!


The scheme involved two accounts -- the hacked account and the one used to bribe miners.


The Flashbots team has released a project called Flashbots/ Searcher-Sponsored - TX that describes the basics of how to link transactions through this solution.


We will use the funds in another account to pay the transaction fee, so there is no need to have the ETH in the hacked account. In fact, we'd love to have our account hacked without ETH, after all, the last thing we want is for a scammer/" scavenger "to detect that we're trying to withdraw our money and use the original ETH in our account to beat us to it.


To make sure there is no ETH in the hacked account, we highly recommend running a burner bot.


We generally recommend running the burner robot on more than one machine and using a different RPC node for each instance. For example, use Infura to run a burner locally, and use another provider (such as Quiknode) to run a burner on a remote server. This allows for redundancy in case of problems such as high network latency or node failure (for example, rate limits, synchronization issues, etc.).


The code in Flashbots/searcher-sponsored -TX will need to be changed to suit your specific needs, but there is an engine that can help you save the tokens in the hacked address. The Flashbots engine is very flexible and can support a single transfer() call, or unstake() and transfer() calls.


If you don't understand the code, also can try @ kendricktan/flashbots flashbots function UI tools website provides:https://flashbots.tools/.


Advertise: If the above solution is too difficult for you, you can also ask us for help and we will charge you 5% of your money back. While we would like to offer the service for free, our time is limited due to the overwhelming number of requests. We will use the proceeds from this service to promote the safe development of the blockchain industry!


Thank you for your understanding.


If you would like to access this service, please contactsupport@mycrypto.comSend it with the subject line "Account Sweeper - Requesting Assistance!" In the mail.


The email address above is the only way to get help. We will not advertise the service on Telegram, Discord or elsewhere to avoid additional risk.


How to avoid "scavenger" fundamentally?


The best precaution is of course to protect their address is not "scavenger" intrusion, also do not need to and "scavenger" battle of wits.


In recent years, we have seen examples of the opposite in the UI of some apps, which allow users to use the original confidential information in the dApp interface. This is very unsafe and should not be encouraged.


引介 | 如何打败以太坊清道夫,挽救你的资产


Never enter your original confidential information (private keys, Key Store files, and mnemonics) on an Internet-connected device or on any web page.


We recommend using hardware wallets to ensure that private keys are stored on separate devices -- if you're using MetaMask to interact with a dApp, MetaMask recently released an update that allows users to use multiple hardware wallet addresses.


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