The original title: "Liu Yi: Web3.0 in the end is constant or alarmist?"
Original source: Web3 Explorer
This article is from founder & of Octopus Network; Liu Yi, a partner of Random Capital, delivered a speech from Web2.0 to Web3.0 at the 12th event of Wanxiang Blockchain Honeycomb Academy "Technology Changes the World: The Coming Web3.0 Era".

Liu Yi, founder of Octopus Network
Good afternoon, everyone. The topic of my discussion today is "From Web2.0 to Web3.0". What is Web3.0? The Internet is currently in the stage of Web2.0. Web3.0 is the design and assumption of the next generation of Internet. Fifteen years ago, Sir Tim Bernard-Lee, the inventor of the Web, argued that the limitations of the Web today are that HTML is for people to read, there is no metadata, and it cannot be understood by machines. Therefore, we should endow the data with meaning and develop more intelligent and automated Internet applications, so as to realize Web3.0, that is, Semantic Web. But about five years ago, Sir Lee's vision for the next generation of the Internet changed, when he launched the Magna Carta movement, calling for a broad discussion among users and practitioners about the future of the Internet.
Dr. Gavin Wood came up with a revolutionary vision for Web3.0 in 2014 and later launched the Web3 Foundation. His philosophy: Web3 is a broad set of movements and protocols to make the Internet more decentralized, verifiable, and secure; The vision of Web3 is for a serverless, decentralized Internet where users control their identity, data, and destiny. Web3 will kick-start a new global digital economy, create new business models and markets, break platform monopolies and drive broad-based, bottom-up innovation.
No matter what kind of Web3.0, the starting point is that the current Internet Web2.0 is imperfect and flawed. And the problem of Web2.0 is not small, small repair can not be solved, need to update. Therefore, the analysis and understanding of Web3.0 should start from the understanding of the deficiencies of Web2.0. Before we begin, I want you to consider the question of why, on the one hand, Web3.0 advocates say the Internet is broken! ; On the other hand, billions of Internet users around the world enjoy Web2.0 services and know little or nothing about Web3.0. Is Web3.0 a reminder or alarmist?
The modern social and economic system is a vast network in which every enterprise or individual is connected, participating in the provision of some products or services, and at the same time purchasing and consuming more kinds of products and services. The invisible hand (market mechanism) works efficiently at the edge of the network. Producers keep innovating in order to increase profits and cope with competition, and constantly improve production efficiency. Consumers look for affordable products and services that maximize their utility within their affordability. The "invisible hand" does not always work well in the middle of the web, the complex transactional/exchange process. Information asymmetry will increase the transaction cost and even hinder the transaction. At the same time, the existence of information asymmetry produces the demand for information intermediary.
The business model of Web2.0 Internet enterprises is to use Internet technology to effectively and massively eliminate information asymmetry and reduce transaction costs, so as to replace the traditional intermediary and create a new intermediary model. Jean Tirole of France, winner of the 2014 Nobel Prize in Economics, published his paper "Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets" in 2003, systematically elaborating the value positioning and business strategies of platforms in two-sided markets. Since then, organizations that trigger interaction between two or more groups of users to create value have been called bilateral or multilateral platforms, or platforms. In 2016, two academics in the US published Platform Revolution: The Business Model Changing the World, which made it clear that the essence of Web2.0 is platform economy, and claimed that platforms are eating the world.
And so it is. In 2018, the world's top 10 listed companies were ranked by market capitalization, of which 8 were platform-based companies. Platform companies also occupy 8 of the top 10 most profitable companies in 2019. The 10 most profitable listed companies in China in 2018, including six banks (ICBC/CCB/ABC/BOC/Communications/China Merchants), one insurance company (Ping An), one telecom operator (Mobile) and two Internet companies (Tencent/Alibaba), are all platform companies. The 10 companies account for nearly 40 percent of the profits of the 500 largest listed companies. Moreover, the unicorns that are popular with the capital markets are almost invariably platforms. Dozens of bank-listed companies generate more than half of the total profits of China's A-share listed companies, and have been doing so for A decade.
Platforms capture most of the economic value added, and society as a whole works for them. Is that normal? Is it true that in the past 20 years, of all the companies in the world in China, only the platforms have increased their labor productivity? Platform services have network effects, that is, the more users the service will get better and better. Therefore, when the scale of the platform reaches a certain level, it will form a virtual monopoly, and it is difficult for similar start-ups or small businesses to compete with it. Take taxi hailing, for example. After the merger with Kuaidi, Didi now has almost all the drivers and passengers for ride-hailing. It has been difficult for other car-hailing sites to develop, and for drivers and passengers to disengage from Didi. Didi's core mission is to make money for its shareholders, so it can justifiably use its monopoly position to maximise profits by raising ride-hailing fees as much as possible and keeping drivers' share down. This is a kind of rent-seeking behavior, that is, the use of special status to expand their own income distribution share, while their contribution to production remains unchanged. Didi's contribution to ride-hailing remains the same as it was three years ago, but as its growing scale has cornered the market, it has turned the subsidy into a cut. It is because of the monopoly platform continued rent-seeking, the proportion of income distribution is getting bigger and bigger.
Internet companies dominate markets by holding vast amounts of data about service providers and users. Is mastering data the original sin of the Web2.0 platform? Should platforms pay users to use their data? Some Web3.0 startups start with the idea of protecting privacy. So what exactly is privacy? Is privacy just about human rights and dignity, or does it make economic sense? Will the personal data storage project succeed? This paper attempts to use economic methods to analyze transactions, information and platforms, hoping to give some enlightenment to answer these questions.
Platforms create value by facilitating transactions/interactions between different groups of users. This paper focuses only on trading platforms, and does not discuss platforms whose core value orientation is to promote interaction, such as social networks, instant messaging, and content communities. The core of trading platform is to eliminate information asymmetry and reduce transaction costs. To understand a trading platform, one must first understand information asymmetry.
It can be said that the buyers and sellers have been in a state of information asymmetry since the transaction began. Let's take a look at what information buyers and sellers have. For example, if you go to work in a company, time is a little tight, you decide to take a taxi, taxi is demand. So here and now, the express cars, taxis and special cars running within a certain area of the surrounding area are supplied. Or you don't want to cook at night, and you don't want to go out to eat in cold weather, so you decide to order takeout. When you order takeout, you demand it. The restaurant that provides takeout within a certain range of the same city is the supply. Preference refers to the personalized needs of buyers. For example, the preference includes class, taste, timeliness requirements, and whether they value preferential coupons, etc. Quality here is not a narrow sense of quality, but a broad sense of the seller's ability to provide goods or services to meet the needs of buyers. Utility refers to the benefits that buyers get from goods or services. Utility is quantifiable, but it is often subjective and vague. For example, if you order a takeout meal for 30 yuan, and after eating it, you feel it is worth it, then you can consider that you have gained more than 30 yuan in utility. On the other hand, if you don't think it's worth it, the meal is likely to cost you less than 30 yuan. In some cases, the amount of utility the buyer receives can be precisely quantified. For example, someone buys something for $50 and sells it for $80. If he knows for certain that he can sell at a higher price before he completes the purchase, then the utility he gets from the purchase is the difference, which is $30. Cost is easily understood as the value the seller has put up front to provide the good or service. In the state of complete information asymmetry, demand, preference and utility are the exclusive information of the buyer, while supply, quality and cost are the exclusive information of the seller.
The following is an example of a simple transaction without intermediation to illustrate the exchange of information during a transaction. A farmer went to a market to buy a hoe. In the market there were stalls selling farm tools. Stall owners put the hoe out to sell, is open supply information. The farmer chooses at the stall, also discloses his demand information. At this time the stall will recommend to the farmer, said their hoe has what advantages, etc., this is the seller in the open quality information. If the farmer cannot verify the authenticity of the quality information, there are three possibilities. One is that the farmer cannot determine whether the utility obtained from the transaction is positive, that is, it is not worth it, and decides to abandon the transaction. The second is that the farmer decides to accept the risk of being cheated (i.e. the risk of negative utility) in order to complete the transaction. Third, the farmer asks a friend who knows the business to help him choose, that is, to hire an intermediary. These three choices also show that information asymmetry constitutes transaction friction and increases transaction costs. In this example, the exchange of information is limited to the transaction. The reality is, of course, much more complicated. For example, a farmer may already know the quality information of which farm is good and which is bad before he goes to market. For simplicity's sake, assume that the farmer himself is an expert on tools and has the ability to identify quality, which means that the buyer has authentic and reliable quality information. After much selection, the farmer found a suitable hoe, both of the right length and weight, and began to negotiate with the vendor about the price. At this point, the vendor can be sure that the product is suitable, even if he doesn't know the farmer's preferences. Of course, farmers often pretend they don't like the hoe that much to hide their preferences.
When supply and demand match and quality meets preference, the condition for transaction is that price is lower than utility and higher than cost. If the farmer's psychological price is $200, this is his estimate of the effectiveness of the hoe. On the other hand, the combined cost of producing and selling the hoe is 100 yuan. So in theory, as long as the price is set between 100 yuan and 200 yuan, both parties can get profits and the deal can be concluded. The transaction price depends on the game between the two sides. If the farmer knows that the hoe will cost $100, his optimal strategy is to offer $101 and hold out for no more. Without considering the impact of this transaction on other transactions, the seller can only accept the price of 101 yuan. After all, there is always some profit. On the other hand, if the vendor knows the farmer's psychological price is 200 yuan, he can let the price go to 199 yuan and then refuse to go any lower, thus maximizing his profit. Thus, the buyer should keep the utility information confidential, and the seller should keep the cost information confidential, so as to avoid being at a disadvantage in the negotiation.
For an extreme example of information about utility exposure: you take a taxi to go to company work in the morning, you get the utility is a variety of factors, and are constantly changing, these factors include: if your company has a strict work attendance checking system, is the number of late this month, the superior and colleagues view of late, the day have a important meeting or an appointment and so on. Of course, a taxi may be used to catch a plane, or to see a doctor at the hospital, and the utility varies. This is information that only you can fully understand, and only you can estimate the utility of a taxi. Suppose the ride-hailing service exchanged data with the company's OA SaaS service provider and learned that you had already been late twice this month, and that if you were late again, your pay would be deducted, so they only gave you the option of taking a private car and having to charge a premium. How terrible! It can be seen that once the utility information is mastered by the service side, the user will be in the disadvantageous position of being a predator in the transaction.
Cost information, on the other hand, is related to production methods and techniques. The producer of the product or the provider of the service invests in the technology, method, knowledge, and skill in order to reduce the cost as much as possible within a given quality standard. If the producer's cost information is fully exposed, then no matter how he improves his technology, he cannot get more profits, and he will have no incentive (and no ability) to make reproduction inputs.
Therefore, information asymmetry does not always increase transaction costs, and information types should be distinguished to eliminate information asymmetry. Preferences, utilities, and costs are private information and should not be exposed in the course of a transaction. So beyond human rights, dignity, etc., privacy makes economic sense. Some people say: I do things aboveboard, nothing can not let people know, so do not need privacy. The implication is that people only care about privacy when they do bad things. From the above analysis, we can see that this is a wrong view.
Understanding the asymmetry of information in the trading process can lead to inferences about how good trading platforms should work, as well as which ones behave badly. The good and bad in this paper are not moral considerations, but economic considerations for the benefit of society as a whole. There are two principles: the first is the principle of efficiency, that is to give resources to the people or organizations that can use them most effectively, that is to strive for the so-called Pareto optimality. The second principle is fairness, try to make the distribution of wealth more equal, to avoid serious polarization between the rich and the poor.
Let's examine the example of a farmer buying a hoe. So in this case the utility is 100 dollars more than the cost, which means that once the transaction is done, society as a whole gains 100 dollars in economic value. And in this case, no matter what the bargaining result is, it does not violate the principles of efficiency and fairness. If the price is negotiated well, farmers can use the money they save to buy fertiliser or to consume it. If the price is not negotiated well and the stall owner makes more money, he can increase the reproduction input or raise the living standard. The balance is that neither side has the special ability to make sure that every deal has an advantage. If a giant farm tool distributor emerges, promise low prices. All the farmers stopped going to the market and bought their hoes from dealers. The tool mills, unable to compete, turn to distributors, where prices are kept to a minimum. The mode of monopoly distribution has a network effect, and the giant distributors can gradually control the operation of farm tools in the whole province and even the whole country, just like what Wal-Mart did in the commodity market. So is this kind of trading pattern good? For the farmer, he gets consistently low prices without paying a negotiated cost. But a significant portion of the proceeds from the transaction go to the dealer. When dealers monopolize the market, more profits will not improve efficiency. Suppliers spend less on improving production because prices are constantly depressed. As we all know, the Walton family behind Wal-Mart is the richest family in the world, with a fortune of $190 billion, which is tens of thousands of times the size of the average American family. Overall, the gap between rich and poor in the United States is already very high and getting worse. Historical experience shows that extreme inequality usually leads to revolutions in which social structures are torn down and rebuilt.
Based on the above analysis, we can conclude the role that the platform should assume in the transaction: to be an intermediary, not a middleman. Once a platform becomes a middleman, the goal is to create as much price difference as possible. By virtue of scale (due to network effects) and information advantages, platforms can squeeze sideways to capture more and more economic value added. Many traditional platforms adopt the middleman model, such as retail giants, commercial banks, insurance companies, etc. There are also some Internet platforms as intermediaries, the most typical of which are travel services, such as air tickets, hotels, taxis and tourism.
For demand and supply information, the platform will be fully open supply and demand information, to provide matching services. For example, e-commerce websites, where all users can browse and search all commodity information, meet the standards of a good platform. A negative example would be a search on Baidu for the name of a company that did not pay Baidu, and the search results would not show the company's official website. And it's often preceded by questionable links. This is a classic example of a bad platform that deliberately hides the most valuable information to users and uses algorithms to create trading traps.
The utilization and screening of preference and quality information is the biggest application direction of big data and artificial intelligence. Good platforms disclose quality information truthfully and comprehensively, and help buyers sift through quality information through evaluation systems and smart technology. With the permission of the buyers, the company provides recommendation services for the buyers by using the preference information. In addition, the use of preference information to provide statistical prediction services for sellers will be a big market in the future, big data and artificial intelligence will play a big role. For example, you may often see that some catering stores are repeatedly rented, today do high-end Japanese ingredients, a few months do not go down, and changed to civilian Sichuan cuisine and so on. Such repeated experiments are actually the allocation process of production resources, and information technology can be used to improve the efficiency of allocation. For example, through the consumption data of Meituan (which is essentially the buyer's preference information), the operation situation of the restaurant in this location can be predicted, so as to improve the success rate of the restaurant operation and better meet the consumption needs of the surrounding users. To provide such services using user preference data, the platform requires explicit permission from the user (that is, the default is no consent). In order to get permission from users, the platform naturally offers incentives such as coupons and points.
There is now a class of Web3 startups that argue that users' private data should be kept on their own. In terms of preference data alone, I don't think it makes economic sense for users to keep the data themselves. The first reason is that the platform does not charge users for using preferred data and storing it. If users keep their data themselves, they typically have to pay cloud storage providers. Going from free to paid is unlikely to be accepted by all but a few people who are particularly concerned about privacy. The second reason is that the centrally stored preference for big data is a treasure trove. The segmented stored data is difficult to be used by data mining and artificial intelligence, which is equivalent to destroying its value. To destroy value on the grounds of unfair distribution is not progress or regress, just as the Luddite movement destroyed the machine in the early days of the Industrial Revolution.
The evil of the platform is most obviously reflected in the attitude towards false quality information. In order to gain profits, bad platforms acquiesce and even connive at false quality information. For example, Baidu's medical advertisements, Baidu believes that they are only responsible for checking whether the advertisers have medical qualifications, and have no ability or responsibility to check the authenticity of the information. But medical treatment is the field of serious information asymmetry, Baidu bidding ranking objectively provides the mechanism of reverse selection of quality information, that is, the more profiteering, the more exaggerated advertising ranking higher. This is completely contrary to the principle of efficiency and fairness. If Baidu were a responsible company, it would ban medical advertising altogether, since it recognizes that it cannot help consumers identify and filter quality information.
Finally, the seller's cost and the buyer's utility are the basis for their equal participation in the transaction. Platforms should not use data and algorithms to extrapolate buyer utility and seller cost. As an information intermediary, we should respect the pricing power of the seller. At the same time, buyers should be treated equally, and the understanding of buyers should not be used to engage in price discrimination, that is, the so-called big data killing.
Most people would agree that Internet platforms are getting worse. This has nothing to do with the declining trend of the world or the degeneration of human beings. It is the result of competition in the free market. From the above analysis, it can be seen that at every level, the bad platform has stronger ability and greater space to make profits than the good platform. Both Web2.0 platforms and traditional platforms are enterprises. For a long time, there has been a tripartite game for the interests of users, employees and shareholders, but it is recognized as the duty of enterprises to maximize the interests of shareholders. So it's no surprise that the vast majority of businesses are profit oriented. As a monopoly platform enterprise, Alibaba takes "users first, employees second, shareholders third" as the first value, which can be called a great initiative. However, under the current business environment, whether it can be truly realized and maintained for a long time remains to be proved in the future.
The worst case scenario for Web2.0 is the continuous consolidation of Internet platforms, creating a monopoly platform of omniscience and omnipotence. It knows all the information about all the buyers and all the sellers, robbing the economic value of all the transactions. Such a scary future is unlikely, first because of industry regulation. According to the above analysis of good platforms and bad platforms, it is relatively easy to come up with some regulatory rules for trading platform enterprises, including: prohibiting platforms from acting as intermediaries; Full disclosure of supply and demand information; The false quality information platform shall bear joint and several liability; Recommendation service explicit subscription; Prohibit the use of data across business lines; Prohibiting price discrimination; Users can export, erase, and so on all their personal data. It is not difficult to determine the rules governing the Web2.0 platform. However, the reality is that the platform giants are not well regulated, and the abuse of monopoly advantages to make improper profits has become the norm.
Why did the regulation of Web2.0 platforms fail? The authors of Platform Revolution argue that the main impediment to the effectiveness of regulation is the problem of "regulatory capture", in which the regulated influence the regulator in ways that favour them. This is not the main cause of regulatory failure. In the 1980s America used antitrust law to break up AT&, a telecoms giant; T. In the 1990s, the debate over whether to break up Microsoft, the operating system giant, was raging. But in the last decade, while FAANG has become a de facto monopoly, there has been little talk of breaking up the Internet giants. The reason is not that Internet giants have more lobbying power, or that regulators are now more corrupt, but that Internet platforms are already strategic forces in the national economy, and the competition between platforms is a game between great powers. Like the global economic landscape, the Internet is dominated by American and Chinese companies. The top 20 companies in the 2018 Global Internet Listed Companies Market were dominated by Chinese and American companies. The rise of Internet companies is also the most important economic achievement of China in the new century. In this context, it is easy to understand the dilemma of regulating Web2.0 platforms: whether it will lead to increased monopoly, affect efficiency improvement and social equity. They also worry about affecting business operations and undermining the country's economic competitiveness. The GPDR, Europe's strictest data-use regulation, is not a big reason for its lack of home-grown Internet giants. Europeans rely heavily on American Internet service providers and suffer from monopolistic platforms. Over the years, the EU and other EU countries have fined Google more than 10 billion euros. But fines alone will clearly not close the gap between monopolies and start-ups.
The result of free market competition is that the Internet is monopolized by bad platforms, and the regulation is unable to restrain the evil of platforms. The historical responsibility falls on the shoulders of Web3.0. At the heart of Web3.0 is a new form of platform, which is a set of cryptographically guaranteed trading rules called cryptographic protocols. Based on cryptographic protocols, groups of users directly trade/interact with each other, creating value and network effects together. Unlike existing platforms, cryptographic protocols are not run by enterprises, but are maintained by a community of many independent entities. The nature of a cryptographic protocol that is not controlled by a single entity or a coalition of interests composed of a few entities, namely decentralization.
Decentralized cryptographic protocols have built-in incentives to distribute cryptographic tokens to participants according to rules. The more participants contribute to the growth of the platform, the more tokens they receive. As the value of tokens grows along with the economic scale of the platform, participants create value and share benefits together. It can be seen that the decentralized encryption protocol is a revolution in the way of platform organization and distribution, and constitutes a dimension-reducing blow to the traditional platform. Although encryption protocol has essential advantages, it is faced with the same problems as all new technologies, such as immature technology, high cost, poor use experience and low user acceptance. The early entrepreneurial opportunities of Web3.0 should not be positive PK with Web2.0, but should choose the field where Web2.0 has not achieved great success. In addition, Web3.0 is not a separate system developed in parallel with Web2.0. The collaboration of decentralized encryption protocol and centralized platform can give full play to their respective advantages, create new usage scenarios and achieve integrated development. Web3.0 is expected to be the first to be applied in finance, energy, labor market, government, Internet of Things and other fields.
As with traditional platforms, crypto protocols can be dominant in certain markets. Once the group benefiting from the high intermediary fee controls the governance right of the encryption protocol, the governance decision orientation will be to continue to increase the intermediary fee, that is, rent-seeking. But rent-seeking in cryptographic protocols is limited by the forkability of blockchains. When cryptographic protocols capture too much as middlemen, forks can create arbitrage opportunities. Forked chains inherit all the data of the original chain, and lower fees attract participants who benefit from low intermediary fees, compete with the original chain, and even replace the original chain. In addition to inhibiting rent-seeking, forkability keeps cryptography protocols open to competition. Once a cryptography protocol is stagnant, a forked chain can compete for participants in the original chain with more efficient trading rules and fairer incentives. It can be seen that the encryption protocol solves the platform monopoly problem at the basic level.
"Technological Revolution and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and the Golden Age" divides the past 200 years of economic development into five cycles, each driven by technological revolution, lasting about 50 years. Each round of technological revolution has the deep participation of financial capital, and has profoundly shaped the social and economic system. The era of information and telecommunications, marked by the Intel microprocessor, has lasted 50 years since the early 1970s. Human society is at the starting point of the next technological revolution era. If crypto protocols are the next technological revolution, not only will financial capital be as deeply involved as ever, but the mechanics of how they operate will also face major changes.
The following is from The Technological Revolution and Financial Capital: "... every technological revolution is treated as a shock to be accepted by the society. It will meet the people in the process of diffusion and the system of the strong resistance. Therefore, technology revolution on the potential for wealth creation fully developed, the original will always have the quite confusion and contradiction between social consequences, then you need a major restructuring of society. This includes not only the changes that affect all markets and framework, the regulation of economic activity to design into a series of whole system, including the government, financial regulation and education, but also on social behavior and ideas. It is remade with the potential of the technology revolution to adapt to the environment, The Golden Age was born."
Perhaps it is best to quote Marx's profound insight that the productive forces determine the relations of production. Each round of technological revolution will bring new productivity into conflict with the system and supervision at that time, and it will go through a process from fracture to re-coupling. Our good luck is that policymakers have understood that, rather than using existing institutions to impose constraints on new productivity, they have given innovation room to flourish and allowed a degree of chaos. But regulators in every country have two bottom lines: one is to tolerate innovation, but not scam. Second, we must not jeopardize financial and social stability.
Some researchers call for blockchain entrepreneurs to focus on compliance and embrace regulation, but I don't entirely agree. You know, Web3.0 entrepreneurs are the latest productivity explorers, and they face an awkward situation where there are no rules. In my opinion, Web3.0 startups need to fit the rules of the future. When cryptographic protocol is implemented on a large scale, its advantages and limitations have been revealed, and I believe that regulators will be able to work out appropriate rules. Future regulations will embrace Web3.0 projects that can improve the efficiency of the allocation of production resources, reduce transaction costs, promote the development of the real economy, and promote social equity.
At a time when both entrepreneurs and regulators are feeling their way, Web3.0 entrepreneurs need to get back to the basics without thinking too much about compliance. First of all, Web3.0 is a real innovation, and if encryption protocols don't improve efficiency, reduce costs, and promote fairness, it's a scam. Second, entrepreneurial projects are social resources no matter where the funds come from. Entrepreneurs have a responsibility to spend their money on technological innovation. If the cryptographic protocol is successfully implemented, the entrepreneur and other participants in the community share the proceeds. If the deal does not work, that is a reasonable price society pays for innovation, as long as entrepreneurs do not squander their money and line their own pockets. In addition, conditional Web3.0 entrepreneurial projects should strengthen communication with regulators, both sides understand and learn from each other, and jointly explore the development path of Web3.0.
The above is my share, thank you!
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