Original author: Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin
Original translation: Chain Catcher
The Bitcoin and Ethereum ecosystems invest far more in network security (i.e., PoW mining) than in all other areas combined. Since the beginning of the year, the Bitcoin network has paid miners an average of about $38 million in block rewards per day, plus about $5 million in transaction fees per day. The Ethereum network ranks second, paying an average of $19.5 million in block rewards per day, plus an average of $18 million in transaction fees per day.
Meanwhile, the Ethereum Foundation's annual budget is only $30 million per year, which is used to pay for research, protocol development, grants, and various other expenses. The Bitcoin ecosystem's spending on R&D is likely even lower, at about $20 million per year.

Obviously, this spending pattern is a massive misallocation of resources. 20% of the network's hashrate is of far less value to the ecosystem than resources devoted to research and core protocol development could provide. So why not cut 20% of the PoW budget and use the funds for other things?
The standard answer to this conundrum is related to concepts such as "public choice theory": while we can easily identify some valuable public goods and invest some of the funds in them all at once, developing a regular institutionalized model for such decisions would risk policy chaos that is not worth it in the long run.
But whatever the reason, we are faced with the interesting fact that the organisms that are the Bitcoin and Ethereum ecosystems are able to attract billions of dollars of capital, but have strange and incomprehensible restrictions on where that capital can go. The powerful social forces that produce this effect are worth understanding, and are why the Ethereum ecosystem was able to gather the same social forces behind these resources in the first place (and the technically nearly identical ETC was not).
This social force is key to helping blockchain networks recover from 51% attacks, and is the basis for a variety of extremely powerful mechanisms that extend far beyond the blockchain space. In the following chapters, I will give this powerful social force a name: orthodoxy.
To better understand the power we are in, an important example is the saga of Steem and Hive. In early 2020, Justin Sun acquired Steem, the company, which is not the same thing as the Steem blockchain, but the company owns about 20% of the STEEM token supply. The community certainly did not trust Justin Sun, so they held an on-chain vote to formalize a long-term "gentleman's agreement" that the Steem company's tokens are held in trust for the common good of the blockchain and should not be used to vote.
With the tokens held by the exchange, Justin Sun fought back and won enough node control to unilaterally control the Steem blockchain. The community had no further options, so they forked the Steem blockchain and named it Hive, and copied all the token balances of the STEEM blockchain except those involved in the attack, including Justin Sun's.
The lesson we can learn from this situation is that the company never really "owned" the tokens. If they did, they would have the actual ability to use, enjoy, and abuse those tokens in any way they wanted. But in fact, when the company tried to abuse those tokens in ways that the community didn't like, they were successfully stopped. The situation here is similar to the pattern of Bitcoin and Ethereum rewards that have not yet been issued: these tokens are ultimately owned not by keys, but by some kind of social contract.
We can apply the same reasoning to many other structures of the blockchain. Take the ENS project private key multi-signature as an example. It is controlled by seven prominent ENS and Ethereum community members, but what would happen if four of them got together and "upgraded" the registrar to one that would transfer all the best domain names to themselves? In the context of the ENS smart contract system, they are fully capable of doing this and there is little challenge. But if they really try to abuse their technical abilities in this way, everyone knows what will happen: they will be ostracized by the community, the remaining ENS community members will sign a new ENS contract, restore the original domain name owners, and every Ethereum application using ENS will redirect their UI to the new interface.
Legitimacy governs all kinds of social status games, intellectual discourse, language, property rights, political systems and national borders, and even blockchain consensus works the same way: the only difference between a soft fork accepted by the community and a 51% attack is legitimacy. After a 51% attack, the community can coordinate additional forks to kill the attacker.
To understand how orthodoxy works, we need to delve into some game theory. There are many situations in life that require coordinated and consistent behavior: if you only act in a certain way, you may achieve nothing (or worse), but if everyone acts together, the desired outcome can be achieved.
A natural example is driving on the left or right side of the road: it doesn't really matter which side of the road people drive on, as long as they drive on the same road. If you change directions at the same time as everyone else, and most people like the new arrangement, then you will get a net gain. But if you are the only one driving, no matter how much you like driving on the other side, the final outcome will be quite negative for you.
Orthodoxy is a higher-order acceptance paradigm. An outcome in a social context is orthodox if people in that social context widely accept and play their part in enacting that outcome, and everyone does so because they want everyone else to do the same.
Legitimacy is a phenomenon that arises naturally in cooperative games. If you are not in a cooperative game, there is no reason to act in accordance with your expectations of how others will act, so legitimacy is not important. But as we have seen, cooperative games are ubiquitous in society, so legitimacy becomes very important.
These mechanisms are driven by an established culture, that is, everyone pays attention to these mechanisms and acts in accordance with them. Everyone has reason to believe that since everyone else follows these mechanisms, if they make different choices, they will only create conflict and suffer losses, or at least be left alone in a lonely bifurcated ecosystem. If a mechanism can successfully make these choices, then the mechanism has legitimacy.
Legitimacy can be achieved in many ways. Usually, legitimacy arises because the thing that obtains legitimacy is psychologically attractive to most people. But of course, people's psychological intuitions can be very complicated. It is impossible to list all theories of orthodoxy, but we can start with the following aspects:
Orthodoxy of violence: Some people can convince everyone that they are capable enough to implement their will, and it will be very difficult to resist them. (Similar to moral kidnapping)
Orthodoxy of continuity: If something is orthodox at time T, it is orthodox at time T + 1 by default.
Orthodoxy of fairness: Some things can satisfy people's intuitive concept of fairness, so they can become orthodox things.
Legitimacy of process: If the process is reasonable, then the output of that process has legitimacy (e.g., laws passed in democracies are sometimes described this way).
Legitimacy of performance: If the output of a process leads to an outcome that satisfies people, then the process can gain legitimacy (e.g., successful dictatorships are sometimes described this way).
Legitimacy of participation: If people participate in choosing an outcome, they are more likely to view it as legitimate. This is similar to fairness, but not exactly the same, and it depends on the psychological desire to be consistent with your previous behavior.
The public goods funding situation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem is quite poor. There are hundreds of billions of dollars in funds flowing, but the public goods that are critical to the continued survival of capital only receive tens of millions of dollars in funding each year.
There are two ways to respond to this fact. The first is to be proud of those limitations, and of the valiant (even if not particularly effective) efforts your community has made to work around them.
This seems to be the route the Bitcoin ecosystem often takes:
The self-sacrifice of the teams funding core development is as admirable as Eliud Kipchoge running a marathon in less than 2 hours: it’s a display of human perseverance, but it’s not the future of transportation (or, in this case, public goods funding).
Just as we have better technology that allows people to travel 42 kilometers in an hour without requiring special perseverance and years of training, we should also focus on building better social technology to fund public goods at the scale we need, and as a systemic part of our economic ecology rather than a one-off act of charity.
Now, let’s get back to crypto. The main power of crypto (and other digital assets like domain names, virtual land, and NFTs) is that it allows communities to aggregate large amounts of capital without any individual personally donating that capital. However, this capital is limited by the concept of legitimacy: you can’t simply assign it to a centralized team without compromising its value.
Blockchain ecosystems, including Ethereum, value freedom and decentralization. Unfortunately, most public goods ecosystems in these blockchains are still authority-driven and centralized. Whether it’s Ethereum, Zcash, or any other major blockchain project, there is usually one (or at most 2-3) entities that spend far more than the others, leaving independent teams who want to build public goods with little choice. I call this model of public goods funding the “Central Capital Coordinator for Public Goods” (CCCP).
This state of affairs is not the fault of the organizations themselves, who generally do their best to support the ecosystem. Rather, it is the rules of the ecosystem that are unfair to organizations because they hold them to an unfairly high standard. Any single centralized organization will inevitably have blind spots and at least some team members who fail to understand its value. Therefore, it is valuable to create a more diverse and resilient way of funding public goods to alleviate the pressure on any one organization.
Fortunately, we already have the prototypes of alternatives. The Ethereum application layer ecosystem is already there, growing stronger, and has already shown its public awareness. Companies like Gnosis have been contributing to Ethereum client development, and various Ethereum DeFi projects have donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Gitcoin Grants matching pool.
Gitcoin Grants has achieved a high level of legitimacy: its public goods funding mechanism (quadratic funding) has proven to be neutral and effective in reflecting the priorities and values of the community and filling the gaps in existing funding mechanisms.

By investing a small amount of treasury funds into the public goods that make the ecosystem that the public relies on possible, we can make this nascent public investment ecosystem stronger. There are many ways to do this: long-term commitments to support Gitcoin Grants matching pools to support Ethereum client development, or even starting your own donation program that extends beyond the specific application layer project itself.
Of course, there are limits to the value of community support. If a competing project (or even a fork of an existing project) offers users a better product, users will flock to the alternative.
But these limits are different in different cases. Sometimes the influence of the community is weak, but at other times it is strong. An interesting case study in this regard is the case of Tether and DAI.
Tether has had its share of scandals, but despite this, traders continue to use Tether to hold and transfer USD. While decentralized and transparent DAI has its benefits, it cannot take away much of Tether’s market share, at least in the eyes of traders, but DAI’s advantage lies in applications: Augur uses DAI, xDai uses DAI, Pool Together uses DAI, and the list of uses is still growing. Which DApps use USDT? Much less.
So while the power of community-driven legitimacy is not infinite, there is still a lot of leverage to encourage projects to spend at least a few percent of their budgets on the broader ecosystem.
Supporting public goods from value generated outside of Ethereum through the concept of publicly supported legitimacy has value far beyond the Ethereum ecosystem. NFTs are an important and immediate challenge and opportunity, with great potential to greatly help many kinds of public goods, especially creative ones, at least partially address their chronic and systemic underfunding.
However, it may also be a missed opportunity: there is little social value when Elon Musk sells his tweet and makes $1 million, and as far as we know, that money goes only to him (to his credit, he ultimately decided not to sell it). It would be a much less interesting outcome if NFTs simply became a casino that largely benefited already wealthy celebrities.
Fortunately, we have the power to help shape the outcome. Which NFTs people find attractive and which they don’t is a question of legitimacy: if everyone agrees that one NFT is interesting and the other is lame, then people will prefer to buy the first because it has both higher bragging rights value and personal pride in holding it, and because everyone else thinks so, it may resell for a higher price. If the concept of NFT legitimacy can be pushed in the right direction, there is an opportunity to build solid funding channels for artists, charities, and other organizations.
There are two potential ideas here:
First, some institution (or even a DAO) could mint “blessed” NFTs in exchange for a portion of the revenue going to charity, ensuring that multiple groups benefit simultaneously. This blessing could even come with an official classification: is the NFT dedicated to global poverty alleviation, scientific research, creative arts, local journalism, open source software development, empowering marginalized communities, or something else?
Second, we can work with social media platforms to make NFTs more visible on people’s profiles, thereby demonstrating to buyers the values they are committed to. This can be used in conjunction with the previous point to bias users towards NFTs that contribute to valuable social causes.
In summary, the concept of legitimacy is very powerful and appears in any environment where collaboration exists, especially on the Internet, where collaboration is everywhere. Legitimacy is formed in many ways: violence, continuity, fairness, process, performance, and participation are important factors.
Cryptocurrency is powerful because it allows us to mobilize large pools of capital through collective economic will that are not controlled by anyone at the outset. Instead, these pools of capital are directly controlled by notions of legitimacy.
It would be too risky to start public goods financing by issuing tokens on the base layer. Fortunately, however, Ethereum has a very rich application layer ecosystem where we have more flexibility. Part of this is because there is an opportunity to not only influence existing projects, but also to shape new ones that will emerge in the future.
The Ethereum ecosystem cares about innovation at the mechanism design and social level. The Ethereum ecosystem’s own public goods financing challenges are a good place to start. But this goes far beyond Ethereum itself. NFTs are an example of a large pool of capital that relies on notions of legitimacy.
The NFT industry could be a huge boon for artists, charities, and other public goods providers far beyond our own virtual world, but this outcome is not predetermined and depends on active collaboration and support.
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