Original title: "Everything about Ethereum MEV, why do you say it is closely related to you"
Original source: Babbitt
Note: The original author is Charlie Noyes, a researcher from Paradigm Foundation, in this article In it, he explained the concept and types of miner-extractable value (MEV), saying that MEV problems can harm users and the blockchain network. He also mentioned that compared to the simple design of Bitcoin, the complexity of Ethereum and the explosive growth of DeFi applications make the MEV problem it faces more serious than Bitcoin. Finally, he also summarized some potential solutions scheme to alleviate the MEV problem.
 protocols built on top of Ethereum has given us a glimpse of what this innovation might bring in the future. Much like the first internet revolution Like the programming libraries in DeFi, DeFi's )
What is Miner Extractable Value (MEV)?
The concept of Miner Extractable Value (MEV) was first introduced by Phil Daian in
Flash Boys 2.0” paper, and recently, my colleagues Dan Robinson, Georgios Konstantopoulos, and samczsun and I mentioned in the two articles “Ethereum is a Dark Forest” and “Escape from the Dark Forest” This concept. Miner-extractable value (MEV) has become a fundamental concept in cryptoeconomics, but what exactly is MEV? What is its impact on permissionless blockchains? The so-called miner-extractable value (MEV) , is a measure of the profit earned by miners (or validators, sorters, etc.) through the ability to arbitrarily include, exclude, or reorder transactions in the blocks they produce. Imagine that when a large transaction causes the price to generate After the slippage, a $10,000 arbitrage opportunity appears on Uniswap. At this time, the arbitrage robot will notice this opportunity and submit a transaction to capture it. It will mention a transaction fee of $10 to the miners. Then, the following two situations may happen:
The miners will copy and review the arbitrageur's transaction in order to seize this arbitrage opportunity by themselves;
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Other bots will notice this arbitrage opportunity and offer higher transaction fee quotes, starting a bidding war for the right to arbitrage. This kind of auction is called a "Priority Gas Auction" (PGA);
This $10,000 potential profit is the MEV, and if no miners go to capture it, and there is PGA competition, then the auction settles The difference between the price and the total MEV is the winning trader's profit (e.g. if an arbitrage bot pays a miner $7000, the remaining $3000 goes to the arbitrageur). This example gives a high-resolution view of the MEV, but it doesn't yet paint the panorama. MEV is not a rare thing, these little financial games have ripple effects, this post will explore this issue and explain why MEV may hurt Ethereum and its users.

MEV
It is difficult to judge how many MEVs there are in Ethereum. All the MEVs we know so far are just a lower limit. This is because MEV can be created at any time a user interacts with the blockchain, and a smart contract can enable a functionally unlimited number of potential interactions. Therefore, it is not feasible to calculate the total potential MEV of the blockchain by brute force. However, we can use Known extracted MEVs are summed to establish a baseline (this is the "realized MEV" shown in the figure above). We can then use heuristics to infer how much the true lower bound might be higher than our baseline, and the unexplored How the current MEV affects the blockchain environment.
MEV today
The current situation in Ethereum is that most miners have not tried it themselves Capturing MEV. Almost all current activity is driven by non-miner-traders. However, some MEV can only be captured by miners, as they have the right to order (or exclude) transactions at will. Non-miner-traders have access to "simple" MEV PGA cannot effectively express "complex" preferences. This means that most of what we have seen so far are PGA-type MEVs. Just like the example we mentioned above, Uniswap arbitrage is a practical The most common MEV. Another type of MEV that occurs in real life is the theft from a vulnerable smart contract. An example is described in the Dark Forest article by Dan et al., who found a smart contract , which has a loophole that allows anyone to steal funds from it. Dan plans to use the loophole to recover the funds before the thief can steal the funds. However, an arbitrage bot automatically recognizes this opportunity and replicates Dan's transaction, which gave a higher transaction fee, and the bot successfully executed the transaction before Dan, eventually taking the funds.
MEV Tomorrow
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The next era of MEV will come when Ethereum miners start actively exploring MEV. However, until recently, a common assumption generated by the community was that miners are altruistic and will give up actively capturing MEV revenue and continue to run the default node software. Bitcoin miners have chosen not to implement the "selfish mining" strategy based on experience, so there is indeed some precedent that miners will not do evil. But we believe that this "miner altruism hypothesis" has been proven completely wrong in the past 3 months. According to observations, there is indeed a small part of computing power currently exploring and capturing MEV. We believe that the recent frenzied non-miner arbitrageur activity underscores how effectively miners can capture these profitable opportunities as Ethereum miners have started to seriously consider MEV. Additionally, MEV types that are not available to non-miner arbitrageurs represent a completely untapped treasure trove of miner revenue. In a way, it's even more surprising that it took so long for miners to get involved. The dam may have burst: Ethereum and its users may be at risk as miners venture farther into the frontier to explore more exotic forms of MEV and collusion. The remainder of this post explores future prospects in more detail, starting with what we mean by the potential "risk" of MEVs.
MEV may harm users
MEV is An invisible tax that miners can collect from users. In the Uniswap example we mentioned above, a large trade creates a profit opportunity (MEV) worth $10,000, and then the arbitrage robot will arbitrage the market price to match the real price, which makes the Uniswap market more efficient and at the same time No harm to the interests of the original trader. This is an example of a benign MEV transaction. However, a different version of arbitrage for the same trade is where the arbitrage bot identifies the user's trade before executing it and "sandwiches" its trade between its own buy and sell orders. The end result is that MEV imposes an invisible tax on users: arbitrageurs manipulate orders, artificially inflating execution prices, and bots immediately sell for profit. Of course, miners can do this too, and it doesn't even cost them anything. This is the so-called vicious MEV transaction.
MEV may hurt Ethereum
MEV Essentially encouraging consensus instability. Imagine there are two miners, Sam and Dan, who are paid $100 for each block they find. Sam found 3 blocks, the first of which contained a $10,000 Uniswap arbitrage opportunity. So now, Dan has a choice: he can mine on Sam's 3 blocks, or he can try to re-mine the first block in order to conduct Uniswap arbitrage by himself. Obviously, an arbitrage opportunity of $10,000 is far more profitable than a block reward of $100. Reason will allow Dan to defeat honesty, so he decides to re-mine the first block. Since the current longest chain is the one with height 3, Dan also remines the second and third blocks (and captures any MEV in those blocks). After the reorganization, Dan has the longest chain, and he and Sam can continue to mine blocks from the third block. This is called a "time-bandit" attack: if the block reward is small enough compared to the MEV, then it is plausible for miners to break consensus. Our example is in a two-sided system. And in a real multiplayer world, every rational miner could potentially try to reorganize the third block and essentially stop the process. However, this could destroy the value of a miner's investment in computing power. If we see this behavior, it will likely come in the form of shorter, more frequent reorganizations that don't stop blockchain progress entirely.
Is MEV unique to Ethereum?
No, in theory, we can also see MEV on the Bitcoin network. Censoring Lightning Network channels or double-spending dyed coins is MEV. However, our hypothesis is that Bitcoin is inherently less susceptible to MEV than blockchains like Ethereum. The reason is the complexity and "state" nature of both.
The rate at which MEV accumulates on a given blockchain is generally proportional to the complexity of its application layer behavior.
A flexible protocol like Ethereum cannot limit this complexity and inherently tends towards greater complexity over time .
MEV incentives cannot be easily mitigated without changing the user experience on Ethereum.
That's why we say that Ethereum's complexity can be a curse.
MEV follows complexity
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In some purely theoretical sense, even Bitcoin cannot constrain its potential MEV exposure. However, Bitcoin's design does a good job of preventing accidentally high MEV use cases, and in practice, they are rarely seen. This situation does not appear to change in the future, so we do not expect MEV to be a bigger problem for Bitcoin. In contrast, we can observe that the MEV on Ethereum is growing exponentially, which is mainly due to the large value flow of DeFi applications. Those financial primitives that seem so promising, you could also think of them as parasites on Ethereum: they spin an endless MEV network that grows bigger and more complex every day.
Ethereum cannot constrain complexity
If The Lightning Network creates unsustainable MEV on Bitcoin (actually threatening Bitcoin's consensus stability), and we have a relatively simple way of removing from Bitcoin's limited set of rules (scripts) the required opcode. On the other hand, if we find that certain application models (such as DEX, lending, tokenized custody assets, etc.) pose similar risks to Ethereum, it is impossible to rule out the possible implementation of all these behaviors on the EVM. Individual implementations can fork, but we cannot prevent general behavior without permissioned contract deployments or strict restrictions on the EVM. In either case, Ethereum will not be able to enable "permissionless smart contracts".
The MEV problem is hard to solve
Finally, It is natural to ask if Ethereum could have a mechanism to offset MEV in the protocol. In short, at least this cannot be done without changing the Ethereum developer or user experience. Any attempt to prevent miners from accessing a source of income could incentivize the creation of off-protocol markets. For example, if all transactions were only allowed to pay a flat rate, we would see miners collude with traders to accept payments for out-of-band transaction priority. Likewise, if all transaction fees were burned etc., miners would simply collect fees individually. This is why we say that MEV is not easily offset. Of course, some potential mitigations exist now, but they require structural changes to the architecture of Ethereum applications and the way users interact with them.
Conclusion
If Bitcoin's incentive security Sexual failure, at least until the block reward becomes ~0, it is hard to imagine any permissionless blockchain avoiding a similar fate. Bitcoin’s simplicity is not only aesthetically pleasing, but it also minimizes its incentive surface outside of the protocol. In contrast, we would worry more about Ethereum, whose application-layer complexity and MEV continue to grow exponentially. There is a known lower bound on MEV revenue that could be greater than the value of ETH miner security incentives during the year. Large-scale, efficient MEV withdrawals may make it difficult to maintain "taxes" for Ethereum users. Ethereum could become overcrowded and costly for all applications. Platform user experience will be compromised, which could hamper Ethereum’s network effects and momentum. The main unknown, of course, is whether or not Ethereum miners will start utilizing MEV at scale to its maximum extent. Miners can extract all types of MEV with maximum efficiency, so cost and user experience issues could be catastrophic. "Time thieves" are also a possibility, although it is unlikely that miners will damage their long-term interest in Ethereum by a large-scale reorganization. But in a simplified version of the attack, miners can deliberately abandon or reorganize a small fraction of profitable blocks, which can still be harmful. In any case, it is time to seriously consider what measures should be taken should the situation deteriorate.
Mitigation of MEV problems
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The ideal solution would simply be to reduce MEV on Ethereum, or to increase miner security incentives without increasing inflation. In the case of Ethereum, permissionless applications share platform security uniformly, so our options are limited:
Better application design: per Each application can be designed to minimize the number of MEVs it creates. This could be a competitive advantage as users will get lower costs and a better user experience. However, the protocol cannot force applications to do so, and there is a limit to how much MEV can be avoided.
Other security incentives: In addition to block rewards (e.g. EIP-1559 burned BASEFEE or state rent), a steady stream of miner revenue is protocol secure Additional factors, which help offset MEV.
Otherwise, most research has focused on how to make destabilizing consensus (e.g. time thieves attacks) harder or more expensive, rather than avoiding root MEV:
Separation of inclusion and sorting: miners (or verifiers) can only be responsible for transaction inclusion, and take out the right to determine the order of transactions for separate auctions. In theory, this would isolate restructuring incentives. However, this guarantees that users will always suffer the level of MEV withdrawals that come with auctions, which could amount to a multi-blocktime thief attack.
Finality: Satoshi Nakamoto’s proof-of-work mechanism only has probabilistic finality. And BFT-based algorithms have strong finality guarantees, which means that time thief attacks are more difficult, because even a finalized block requires greater collusion to reorganize. However, with enough MEV, the incentive to recombine can still overcome the difficulty of collusion. In addition, participants still have the right to order transactions at will by the block they are proposers in, so finality alone cannot solve the front-running problem.
Proof of Stake (PoS): Based on PoS blockchain, validators who try to reorganize can be severely punished, thus greatly increasing the cost of time thief attacks, especially is when combined with finality. However, with enough MEV, the incentive to restructure may still outweigh the penalty of a large slash.
All of these approaches will have a significant impact on the Ethereum ecosystem, many of which will involve changes to the core protocol and will take years to implement . Those operations that can only be done at the application layer may still require developers to re-architect and migrate most of the ecology to other environments. I hope that the next year will make the development path of MEV and Ethereum clearer. Currently, many of Paradigm's portfolio companies are working on solutions to alleviate the MEV problem. If you are interested in this matter, you can pay attention to them.
Rollup
Rollup has become the main L2 expansion solution of Ethereum, and there are several different styles of Rollup. But in general, Rollup enables aggregators to execute applications off-chain, publishing only the bare minimum of information needed to show fraud (or lack thereof) to the Ethereum mainnet. This allows for low latency and high throughput without giving up the security guarantees of the underlying chain. In addition to being a scaling solution, Rollup can also enable separation of transaction ordering and execution (see Optimism's "MEV Auction" proposal). Vitalik Buterin recently suggested that Ethereum could primarily be the rollup data availability layer that handles all transaction execution, MEV capture centralized into the rollup sequencer ("ETH 1.5"). This would be very different from Ethereum's current design, and would require trade-offs. For example, interoperability across rollups and rollup-mainchains breaks synchronicity and may Different assumptions need to be made in practice (especially in a multi-rollup environment). Our portfolio companies are working on two different rollup types:
StarkWare
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StarkWare is developing ZK-Rollup (ZKRU), which proactively includes proofs of correctness with verifiable block validity, rather than optimistically assuming validity and ensuring Provides fraud proofs. While not the original style of rollup envisioned for separation of execution and ordering, ZKRU enables this. This proof engine can also be used to enforce additional constraints on ordering.