Compiler: Rhythm Institute
In this section, Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin continues his discussion of "Ethereum roadmap with Rollup at its core", and then summarizes EIP 1559 and Phase1.5 for Ethereum 2.0, before concluding with an interesting quick question and answer session.
Design art of Ethereum (Part 1)
Design art of Ethereum (Middle)
Eventually, users will choose to use a decentralized or centralized two-layer network. Coinbase is typically a centralized, two-tier network with licensing alliances like Liquid. If you look at ethereum ecology, many applications are migrating to test networks like xDai or Ropsten.
Vitalik believes that people can be forgiven for using these centralized solutions before the ethereum ecology has a very suitable decentralized expansion scheme. But in the end, when the decentralized scheme is realized, the user had better choose the decentralized scheme.
For some specific applications, special processing schemes occur that allow the application to achieve composability without synchronization. As Vitalik mentioned earlierYankingA good example is this combinatorial problem, which is classified as a "train and Hotel" problem:
If you have A train ticket booking contract on Partition A and A hotel booking contract on partition B, how can you ensure that you can successfully complete both bookings simultaneously? When the train ticket booking contract and the hotel booking contract are in the same piece, it is a very simple thing to complete synchronously. You only need to send a transaction, which contains two orders to complete the reservation. If the transaction is successful, the two orders will be completed at the same time, or if the transaction fails, the two orders will fail together.
However, in an asynchronous environment, this task is more difficult to complete, you need to use the Yanking mechanism to complete. The working principle of Yanking mechanism is as follows: In the first step, you call the train ticket reservation contract in partition A, and then create A separate and independent contract with reservation right. In the second step, you invoke and create the hotel reservation contract in Slice B in the same way. In the third step, you transfer the train ticket and hotel reservation contract that you created independently to the slice where you are. Step 4. Now that all the contracts you need are in the same shard, you can complete the synchronization.
The mechanism works because you pre-create the required permissions for asynchronous contracts in different shards in the same shard, and then in the last step you assign two license contracts in the same shard to complete the synchronization. Solving this train-and-hotel problem is critical to decentralizing exchanges and DeFi projects of all kinds.
In addition to Yanking, another solution is to group different kinds of applications into different shards or Rollups. For example, putting a high-value DeFi application in a Rollup might have a high Gas Price, other applications clustered in other Rollups, but not the ability to synchronize with high-value applications.
Another interesting thing is that after sharding is complete, a Rollup can interact with multiple shards, that is, a Rollup can use data from multiple shards. For example, a high performance Rollup focused on DeFi can scale multiple shards.
In extreme cases, ETH2 does not need to enter Phase2, Rollups can meet the capacity expansion requirements, and finally only need to combine ETH1 and ETH2. You don't have to make major changes per se, but you can make some additional upgrades, such as upgrading to Casper CBC, or applying more zero-knowledge proofs.
In a less extreme case, if future sharding becomes safer and easier to use, and the underlying network is less crowded and expensive, more sharding may become executable sharding for executable smart contracts and other application functions. On the other hand, we can delay Phase2 until zK Snark can conduct zero-knowledge proof EVM, and then the underlying public chain will no longer need to rely on "fraud proof" to ensure security during execution.
There will be many different versions of Phase2 for ETH2, and Vitalik thinks there is no need to focus too much on one version. Meanwhile, Vitalik says ETH2's Phase2 is not the key to capacity expansion with the help of Rollup, and Rollup may be a much easier and faster way to get there.
Vitalk believes the EIP-1559 was originally designed to improve ethereum's exchange rate market. In today's rate market, if the network is crowded, users not only have to pay high transaction fees, but also have to endure long waiting times. Eip-1559 attempts to mitigate and offset the volatility of transaction rates in the form of elastic block capacity. See eiP-1559 for more details"Interpretation of Ethereum proposal EIP1559: Significantly reduce transaction fee totals and volatility")
In an article of Vitalik, it is also mentioned that EIP-1559 can avoid the inefficiency of the first-price auction model and get rid of the security problems caused by "Fee Dominant Blockchain". Overall, EIP-1559 solves many of the problems in the existing rate market.
Another point of concern is the destruction mechanism introduced by EIP-1559. Essentially, the destruction of EIP-1559 establishes the central role of ETH in ethereum ecology. Without the destruction mechanism, ETH would become an "unprivileged" common asset, meaning that eventually other assets in the Ethereum network could replace IT.
Especially in the Rollup, if "sort" (Sequencer) using the ETH pay poundage, but users with DAI or other assets to pay, eventually sort who can deal with mineral pools in private, in other ways to pay, no longer use the ETH, it brought about by the problem, is to protect the security of the network, more and more of the ETH will be cast out, eventually bring burden ETH itself value.
The transaction fee destruction mechanism of EIP-1559 essentially eliminated this problem. Paying for the ETH was the only way to get data recorded on the ethereum chain, because if the user did not pay for the ETH, there would have to be a party to pay for the ETH, because eventually there would have to be a party to destroy the ETH required for the transaction fee.
Miner extractable value refers to the unequal benefits that miners receive from their privileged advantage of being able to adjust the order of transactions in the block.
One of the challenges to solving MEVs is that there are many different types of MEVs. Transaction fees are a key MEV, and by implementing EIP-1559, the value of transaction fees can be largely captured by the agreement. Another kind of MEV is to extract arbitrage value, which miners are not very good at extracting right now. In the future Rollup world, most of this arbitrage value will be acquired by Rollup sequester and Rollup project party. This phenomenon actually reflects a very interesting equilibrium. The value is no longer all captured by security, but given to other Public Goods.
Vitalik states that Phase1.5 for ETH2 is a combination of ETH1 and ETH2. ETH1's global status, account balance, smart contract code, smart contract store, and so on will be cut and pasted into the ETH2 system. If you have an ETH1 client, the client will stop tracking the ETH1 chain and start tracking the ETH2 chain. Then you will be interacting with the ETH2 chain instead of the ETH1 chain.
The user will be insensitive to the ETH1 to ETH2 migration and will not need to do anything. If you're a client developer, ETH1 migrates to ETH2 essentially like a special hard fork. The ETH1 chain will no longer be used after the migration.
In ETH2, in addition to the ETH2 version of EIP-1559, there will be "Stateless Execution" where the block is executed without a global state. This is what ETH1 is slowly exploring, and researchers have released a number of eiPs for stateless execution.
Vitalik: 2020
Vitalik: Short term Optimistic, long term ZK, because ZK can be applied in a more general environment.
Vitalik: Moloch is the god of punishment. He represents that what is wrong in the world will not be wrong if people cooperate better.
Vitalik: China's DCEP is really the pacesetter on this track. In the long run, competition between governments is not an interesting topic. The interesting question might be, can DCEP beat WeChat and alipay? What are the advantages of central bank digital money over other digital payment systems? Will people eventually trade across borders using central bank digital money? Or will people eventually choose decentralized cryptocurrencies? I don't know what will happen in the end.
Vitalik: I'm very hopeful that more and more bitcoins will be minted in the Ethereum network in the future, but I'm very concerned about the trust model of the minators. Many of the bitcoins minted on Ethereum attempt to cover up and not disclose their models of trust, and they are relatively centralised. I would very much like to see decentralized founders, at least using multi-signature trust models. TBTC's trust model is more interesting.
Vitalik: If you're an intrepid enthusiast, you should pledge first, or you should wait. In fact, we want a smaller number of people to participate in the pledge in the first place, and then when they feel appropriate to participate in it.
Bankless Interview links
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