header-langage
简体中文
繁體中文
English
Tiếng Việt
Scan to Download the APP
Partnered With:

Horizon Finance: How to lock in fickle yields in the DeFi market? | project introduction

Read this article in 9 Minutes
I don't have to worry about my APY changing anymore.

It is probably not the rosy vision of decentralized finance that has sparked so much interest in DeFi and led to a surge in lock-up volumes, but the wealth effect of the real surge in tokens and the hundreds and thousands of ApYs.

 

In the global capital market of 2020, with the advent of the era of great navigation (water release), interest rates continue to fall, and even zero and negative interest rates appear in developed countries such as Europe and The United States. In the face of such tempting returns from DeFi, restless money has poured into the market like crazy on a stabiliser boat (Pulse notes, USDT is currently no. 3 with a market cap of $16 billion, Tether minted $6 billion USDT in 2020, and stabiliser has a market cap of over $21 billion).

 


Major national interest rates
Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/

 

However, there is a paradox in the current DeFi market. In the face of unpredictable returns, it is impossible to fully hedge risks without relying on the CeFi market. This makes the pursuit of fixed - yield funds face a great deal of uncertainty risk.

 

Because it is impossible to predict specifically how the imbalance between supply and demand of the currency on the platform will evolve, and the time series related to the change of the lending rate, the two popular lending platforms, Aave and Compound, which use the supply and demand function algorithm to determine the interest rate, cannot provide users with stable interest rate. Who is going to pay for a long lockup in expectation of a fixed rate, but the actual income for some reason becomes quite low?

 

As mentioned above, because most lending activities are based on floating interest rates, it is impossible to form a term structure of interest rates (term structure refers to the relationship between the yield of funds of different maturities and maturity at a certain point. However, the term structure cannot be formed due to frequent and disorderly changes in the interest rate. One way to solve this problem is to create DEX (for example, interest rate swap), but such a method could be viewed as highly illiquid. Even if counterparty orders are found and liquidity issues resolved, the next step is to create mechanisms to ensure that participants have sufficient margin to cover any potential funding gaps, creating more complexity and systemic risk.

 

In response to the current problems with DeFi, Horizon Finance USES game theory to build a yield auction market, giving users a useful tool to lock in fixed yields.

 

How does Horizon lock in the DeFi market yield?

 

Analyze Horizon according to the logic of putting the elephant in the refrigerator in several steps. Horizon is first of all a converged financial management platform. On this platform, an auction (bet) tool based on game is designed for the expected return rate, so as to achieve the effect of locking the return rate. So how does this work?

 

Realize the principle of


Ideally, with money deposited into Horizon, like yearn. Finance and other aggregators, Horizon can automatically select other deals to maximize total revenue. The difference is that Horizon can be funded from any revenue-generating cryptocurrency, which means it can come from different tokens, synthetic assets, or even different chains of assets.

 

And to achieve interest rate lock-in, Horizon has proposed a new incentive mechanism that encourages participants to set specific expectations for their income rates by choosing one of two options: acting as a floating rate participant (a person who pursues uncertainty), which translates as a user who seeks high yields but is in effect a seller of interest rates. Or participating in an auction is, in effect, a buyer of interest rates (the pursuit of stable interest rates), understood as a user of fixed income (but the expectations of fixed income users are also different, as discussed below).

 

Simply put, before the platform figures out the interest rate, users need to make a choice between "sudden wealth" and "stable income".

 

The auction market

 

First of all, users do not know how the yield rate will change, users eager to obtain stable income can participate in the interest rate auction market, according to the demand rate of return quote. Interest rate auctions are transparent and open, Shared among participants, and displayed in real time on the site for everyone to see. It can be changed to a different rate for a small fee before the end of any round of bidding. Finally, participants who are unwilling or not forced to participate in the auction may remain as floating rate participants. It is also possible to switch from a fixed rate participant to a floating rate participant for a small fee if you wish.

 

Each round of auctions is actually the distribution of the proceeds of the token, and the distribution of the proceeds of pool P is distributed from low to high within the fixed interest rate space. Importantly, for any round of users bidding, the rate of return will not exceed the rate of return when participating in the auction. To put it simply, even if you beat your expectations (say, 15%), if you get 7%, you'll only get 7%, not another 8%. In this sense, the interest rate to participate in an auction is the theoretical highest interest rate, even if the interest rate exceeds the user's auction rate, there will be no more interest rate reward. The advantage of this approach is that users who need lower and stable returns are given priority and can get the proceeds before the higher interest rate auctioneer. Those auctioning higher rates, in extreme cases, may not make any money.

 

If for all participating interest rates after users pay the proceeds of the auction, no residual income, then a floating interest rate of the investors in this round of the income is zero (in fact, if in a round, earnings are insufficient to fixed interest rate paid to participate in the auction of users, so higher rates of bidders may also get low income or no income in this round). Alternatively, if the income is high in this round, then all the fixed-rate auction proceeds may be satisfied and the surplus proceeds will go into the floating pool, effectively increasing the income of this portion of the floating rate liquidity provider in this round.

 

If weighted fixed interest rates higher than the average implementation, then participate in the fixed rate of bidding users actually won more profit than the original, and that part of the profit is based on still willing to accept a floating rate of users (in short, select the "get rich" because the user expectations in reality unable to reap the benefits, and select the user that conservative yields obtained their earnings). Conversely, if the weighted fixed interest rate participating in the auction is lower than the average realized interest rate, those users who are willing to accept the floating rate will receive these benefits (" nouveal "users get more than they expected).

 

For example


Examples are given below for easy understanding.

 

The income of round 1, 2 and 3 is expressed as R1, R2 and R3, and rX can represent the interest rate that has been realized in round X. P is the initial capital pool, and the value increases with each round, so that P becomes P1 after round 1, P2 after round 2, and so on.

 

For the sake of simplicity, the following example assumes that there is a round of auctions every day, with the platform's yield rate on the day of each round. This example also does not include the original token reward. The token is qUSD (any stable coin), and Z1, Z2 and Z3 represent the total revenue of each round of agreement (the total revenue paid by the user).

 

In the first round, when the yield rate is 3.5%, the yield on that day is 479.45. The demand of fixed-rate auction users is partially met, and 5% users participating in fixed-rate auction will also benefit from other users and obtain income, with a real yield rate of 4.71%.

 

In the second round, the yield exceeded the maximum auction rate by 10% when the yield was 11.20%, and the yield on the day was 1534.39. The demand of users participating in the auction was fully met, while the yield of users with floating interest rate was 116.78%.

 

In the third round, when the yield rate is 6.7%, the highest auction rate (10%) is not reached, but users who participate in fixed-rate auction with a lower rate than 6.7% benefit from it. The demand of users participating in auction is fully met, and users with floating rate also get 28.12% of the income.

 


 

The relevant formulas associated with the above examples:

 

Z (t) = P (t - 1) ∗ r (t) / 365 & have spent

 

P (t) = P (t - 1) + z (t)

 

The expenditure for each successive bid becomes:

 

Payout (t) = Max [0, & have spent min (size ∗ fixed  IR  the bid / 365, & have spent & have spent z (t) - payout_accum (prev  IR  the bid ∗))]


Project significance

 

First, Horizon offers more options for different risk appetites. A reasonable auction mechanism should be set between floating interest rate (high risk preference) and fixed interest rate auction (low preference, stable yield) to create a reasonable and fair game platform for both sides. As can be seen from the above examples, if the real rate of return cannot all meet the needs of users with fixed rate of return, then users who gain income above the real rate of return will get unexpected protection. And some users who pursue high risk can also take advantage of small probability events to obtain the overflow benefit from the large capital of fixed income auction.

 

Assume that in such a game at the same time, "the masses" will act in a rational way, try to according to individual risk preference to maximize their profits, the platform of the weighted fixed interest rates would as a reasonable future potential returns expected indicators, at the same time for DeFi and CeFi flows of speculative, arbitrage and hedge provides the important reference significance, become the vane of industry.

 

Development team and roadmap

 

Q4 2020 Version 1:

 

Issuance of floating and fixed rate markets with liquidity incentives (with the possibility of liquidity mining to issue tokens). Users will be able to participate in short - and medium-term interest rate market auctions.

 

2021 Q1 Version 2:

 

Expanding to more revenue deals, including Yvault, Balancer Pool, and other secure platforms, will also support longer term interest rate market auctions.

 

Q2 2021 Version 3:

 

Automatic liquidity mining configurations, with machine-consultation-like features, allow users to build their portfolios between different pools, time ranges, and fixed or floating options, depending on their preferences.


Investment background


Horizon seed round raised $1.335 million from Framework Ventures, DeFiance Capital, Mechanism Capital, Spartan Group, Alameda Research, NGC, Ruby Capital and Incuba Alpha Capital.


Resources:https://docs.horizon.finance/general/whitepaper


Welcome to join the official BlockBeats community:

Telegram Subscription Group: https://t.me/theblockbeats

Telegram Discussion Group: https://t.me/BlockBeats_App

Official Twitter Account: https://twitter.com/BlockBeatsAsia

举报 Correction/Report
Choose Library
Add Library
Cancel
Finish
Add Library
Visible to myself only
Public
Save
Correction/Report
Submit