Original title: "Depth | When will the DeFi Supercycle Come?"
Source: Encrypted Valley Live
In this series, I think we have entered a five-year "DeFi supercycle "and are likely to be composed of several small cycles, with the total effect being to quadruple today's total market cap and double the 2017 high of $600 billion on the basis of continued" mainstreaming "of the industry.
In fact, because of some events, we have a very good chance of getting there just in the next 24 months. Here are three examples of how to achieve this goal:
1. Broken DeFi supercycle
2. DeFi of retail investors :DeFi+NFTs
3. DeFi:AI Lego, STO and dPrime
In this article, we focus on the case of broken DeFi supercycles.
In short, DeFi is an extension of Andreessen's "software eating the world".
In this case, business will be "digitized" and "decentralized" : both in the context of capital markets and in all types of business, including its subsets, such as e-commerce.
Over the past decade, between 2010 and 2020, the Internet's software layer has been able to create (coin), store, move, lend, and digitally scarce, programmable value with minimal intermediation. Centralized exchanges and wallets (also known as CeFi) are the smallest intermediary layer that not only improves accessibility but also abstracts technically complex management and custody, but most importantly ACTS as a gateway into the system (for distribution) for new requirements.
Unlike the current financial system, DeFi is a bottom-up, open source, unlicensed, hyper-competitive environment that seeks a balance between yield and efficiency. On the face of it, this may be a paradox and is known as the DeFi paradox. However, I think this is only true if the ecosystem does not grow fundamentally: introduce more collateral (supply) and more liquidity (demand), and end the cycle.
When those two things happen, like the ICOs we saw in 2017, it kicks off a "super cycle." If we look back at that period it's easy to understand that this was triggered by joint innovation:
ERC20 Crowdfunding mechanism (supply) +CEX Centralized Encrypted Exchange (demand) :
Now it's worth mentioning in advance that people like to pit CeFi such as CEX (the lowest mediation layer above) against DeFi. But in fact, if we want to grow the capital and use of the system, they are synergistic: since DeFi needs CeFi, and CeFi needs DeFi, both should be seen as different parts of the same thing. The only difference with CeFi is how DeFi deals with the existing financial system and the relevant regulators. This is where most of the new demand comes from, and where users are happy to pay for bundled services and be held legally liable if something goes wrong. This last point is very important to most people.
First of all, it's worth noting that a lot of people think that the 'supercycle' is a completely bad thing. But historically, when an open capital market tries to put a price on this innovation, it always ends up overestimating its value. The result was a massive correction, which in turn killed the hype.
As an open and unfettered capital market, this seems to be an inherent part of encryption innovation. This is how innovation in this area is financed; In a way that may seem capital-inefficient, it does work, or at least the best way we do it now.

Historically, supercycles have been triggered by such combinations of innovations; It may be made up of the old or it may be made up of the new, but it is often put together in a new and timely manner.
In the first half of this year, we all thought there would be a significant DeFi supercycle and bull market in 2020, but somehow stalled; This should be considered a "crushing cycle" phenomenon. It took me a while to connect the dots, but if you follow the logic above, it's easy to see why and assume the "proper" conditions required for the DeFi supercycle.
So how did it begin and why is it incomplete?
Innovation: Stability currency (supply) + Revenue generation Agreement (Supply)
Produced in the process of "farmed" yields on innovation of the agreement, such as lending and charging, liquidity, mining and sparked a small part of the encryption monetary subset of short madness. However, perhaps less than 5% of tokens are stoked, and these tokens are owned by a much smaller subset of the global cryptography population, for reasons we'll look at later. So, in effect, it is self-sustaining not only within the encryption technology itself, but by a very small subset of it.
In short, it effectively creates a new form of supply without sustaining the new demand it requires. And because it is not tied to any form of sustainable income, it simply creates an artificial income cycle. In the absence of any new liquidity entering the system, this aggressive form of user acquisition (when viewed from a marketing perspective) proved to be a protracted "chicken game" based on typically over-leveraged trading positions based on yield assumptions that were ultimately unsustainable at the system level. Because most importantly, it didn't reach a super level, it didn't break into the mainstream, it didn't bring new demand from new players, and that led to a broader and sustained bull market.

What is it doing?
While the last cycle was broken, or at least incomplete, it did reveal the power of a new supplier innovation -DeFi was essentially building a new financial system from scratch. Decentralised automated market makers (AMMs) and liquidity pools provide an alternative to specialist market makers, order books and clearing facilities. Flash loans provided unprecedented arbitrage and trading capabilities.
This means that debt and leverage can be traded freely in an unlicensed environment, allowing capital to function in mind-boggling ways. Above all, all the governance experiments and the new forms of co-ordination offered to participants, what we inevitably call "digital equity" :
Interest (rate of return) + the number of governance rights *
And it is proved in this particular application; It can quickly channel the liquidity of the network for lending.
* Now it's worth saying that if this sounds like classic equity, that's because it is. And its long-term success depends on its "net market outcomes".
Through "net market results"; I am referring to the degree to which its "hyper-competition" is inevitably successful in bringing efficiency to consumers and competition for any bad behavior compared to the current financial system. Today's 'DeFi premium 'will become 'DeFi discount' as regulators start to enforce it if it doesn't become mainstream properly and have a significant positive impact on consumers. To the extent they can, at least, this will lead to a cat-and-mouse game between regulators and markets that both temporarily constrain the supercycle and amplify it when its inexorable nature is reinforced: hence the forecast of a series of small cycles coming together.
Some people would say, regulators would never permit number stake be retail sale or use, but the currency and etheric fang precedent suggests that in such a license under the environment of innovation, if the design and implement proper, coupled with the appropriate level of review resistance and decentralization, final acceptable or unstoppable regulators catch up time.
Due to its composability and open source nature, the DeFi protocol can be easily replaced or branched, and more and more smarter creators keep enough distance from day-to-day governance. Some even choose (and some, sadly, abuse) anonymity.
As programmable privacy solutions such as secret networks begin to be layered on top of DeFi, community members building and governing protocols, as well as applications built on the protocols themselves, can choose how anonymous they want to be, allowing for more participation, innovation, and decentralization.
Moreover, the irony is that the tools of well-distributed governance may make it harder for regulators to argue that a network is not sufficiently decentralised.
But now, if we review the reasons for the limitations of DeFi1.0: This series of supplier innovation, when combined with the stability coin, can be said to fail to overcome this limitation, because of the constraints of maturity and "protocol adaptation" :
Ethereum Cost + complexity (technology + risk *)
* Finally, because the configurability of the DeFistack is complex, KeyTango's DanDanay can represent "DeepDeFi" in a good way here.
In the next series of articles, I will demonstrate some of the supply and demand both sides (JinZhongQi) innovation, the innovation will eliminate a lot of technical or economic restrictions (in whole or in part), and when they do this, is expected to remove DeFi hand brake, and allows a series of super cycle may be small, the super cycle is likely to converge integration a yuan period, and then form a great bull market of 12 to 18 months.
Is perhaps the most direct NFT (non homogeneous token), as a reward, the mechanism of loyalty and prevent highly cluttered and unsustainable mining liquid, causes the competition to the bottom of economics and the "vampires" (here has a good record), including DeFi agreement was radically bifurcate, new short-term incentives are added, liquidity quickly lost.
What is important is that these supercycles, unlike the first fragmentation cycle, should succeed in generating two new kinds of demand from different types of players: retail and institutional, and their respective liquidity, each with its own preconditions that must be met first.
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