Original title: "Behind ethereum's Sky-high Fee Transfer: A Hacker-initiated GasPrice Extortion attack?"
Source: NBSP; PeckShield
It sounds interesting, but it sounds funny.
As you can see, the blockchain industry we live in is always full of gossip and anecdotes, especially when the market is sideways and the mood is low. But some gossip, we looked at the lively, behind the door but see clearly, such as a famous exchange and mining machine manufacturers of all kinds of enmity and so on.
However, there is another anecdote that we all like to talk about, which looks simple on the surface, but the truth behind it is hard to understand.
On February 19, 2019, a transaction only 0.1 ETH was discovered on the ethereum chain, but the trader gave a fee of up to 2,100 ETH. According to the ETH 969 yuan per piece at that time, the unexpected operation made the miners who packaged the transaction an unexpected harvest of about 2 million yuan.
In the past two days, a similar story has been repeated, and it is crazier and more magical than before:
At 17:47 p.m. on June 10, the address beginning 0xcDD6A2B is addressed to NBSP; The address at the beginning of 0x12D8012 is transferred to 0.55 ETH, but the transaction fee is as high as 10,668.73185 ETH;
At 11:30 a.m. on June 11, the address beginning 0xcDD6A2B is addressed to NBSP again; The address at the beginning of 0xe87fda7 is transferred to 350 ETH, and the transaction fee is also 10,668.73185 ETH;


This wave of SAO operation, 0xcDD6a2B address in a day to spend $5.22 million, a total of about 37 million yuan.
Three routine possibilities for accidental transfers
This can not help but let the broad audience suddenly meng.
We might as well start with a simple analysis of the crowd's perspective, the occurrence of such an accident several possibilities:
1) -- "Tuhao people have a Lot of Stupid money" : The tuhao's hand shook when they willed the transfer, oh, it was two times, just tens of millions of yuan, which is not worth mentioning;
Theme 2) -- "The Big Man is universal" : the big man of the mysterious crest-level coin circle, who gives consolation subsidies to everyone when the market is depressed, and randomly gives red envelopes to miners who have made outstanding contributions to the blockchain community;
Theme 3) -- "Institutional Money Laundering" : a secret money laundering group cooperates with and "buys" several mining pools to carry out illegal money laundering operations;
All three of these are possibilities that the average person can think of, but it's not really that likely to happen. The first two needless to say, in this everywhere is trap, everyone is leek circle, my heart has been wood, not too do not want to believe that there is this possibility.

The third possibility is more fanciful. We found that Spark Pool and Ethermine, which currently account for 30.02% and 21.43% of the calculation power respectively, are the mining pools that package these two abnormal trades. In other words, buying a single pool can only make a third of the money, and to ensure a money-laundering success rate of more than 99%, the money laundering organization must buy more than 10 mining pools at the same time. This is an impossible thing to do, given the current solid mining consensus. & have spent & have spent
A hacker-initiated GasPrice ransomware attack?
Leaving aside the three speculations about eating melons, we might as well sort out from a professional perspective, what is hidden behind these two consecutive abnormal transfer behaviors?
The PeckShield Security team's visual asset tracking platform CoinHolmes based on the existing more than 70 million address tags and professional traceability tracking tool in-depth analysis found:
First, we have to understand NBSP; Who is the address beginning 0xCDD6A2B? Through the analysis, there are many make the address and enter an item of expenditure in the accounts, and back up a layer address found are small and interact with the address were empty, preliminary analysis CoinHolmes team believes that the address is likely a trading platform, hot wallet address, behavior characteristics and its chain we concluded that the characteristics of heat and trading platform wallet address highly match. This means that what hides behind this funny thing is not the capricious smile of the mysterious tuhao, but the helpless wail of the innocent leeks.
Second, since the target address is a trading platform, why would you spend a huge amount of assets without any reason? Especially in the current situation of small and medium-sized trading platforms are struggling to survive, such a suicide show is strange, there is only one possibility, unless the main trading platform has been hijacked by hackers.
Considering this possibility, we found that the story of the abnormal transfer seemed to have a more highly rationalized plot:
1) The address of a trading platform was attacked by hackers in ways such as phishing, and some of its permissions were captured by hackers, such as server management permissions;
2) As the private key of the trading platform has the possibility of multi-check verification, the hacker cannot transfer a huge amount of assets to himself despite having the access to the server account.
3) But the hacker found that he had the authority to transfer money to the whitelist authorized by the address, so it was possible for the hacker to transfer money twice in the case of insufficient authority;
4) Not only that, the hacker also found that he could control the GasPrice permissions, so he could not take away this asset but find ways to spend it.
5) The hacker then sent two abnormal transfers and launched blackmail on the trading platform. The implication is that if the platform does not pay the hacker a ransom in some other way, the hacker will run out of money (there are still 21,000 ETH left in the address).
6) As the server permissions of the trading platform are controlled, it cannot normally use the private key permissions, so it helplessly watches the account money being passive, but it is unable to transfer the remaining money out and stop the loss timely.
At this point, we can speculate that the truth behind these two abnormal transfer behaviors is: a hacker launched a GasPrice blackmail attack on the trading platform.
It is important to note that victims do not have to fall into the extortion trap designed by hackers.
In the case of 2,100 ETH fee transfers in February last year, the end result was that the packaged Pool Spark Pool finally reached a refund agreement with the transferor. We believe that it is imperative for the victim to get in touch with the mining pool that has packaged the transaction in a timely manner. After proving the existence of the binding fact, we believe that the mining pool will give a more reasonable follow-up plan.
conclusion
The above is just a possible result of our comprehensive extrapolation based on the data on the chain and the existing address tag library. We are also conducting further analysis, tracking and investigation of the relevant addresses, as well as exploring the truth behind the matter in terms of synergies between the mine pools. Finally, it is important to note that we cannot guarantee the accuracy of this inference, but if there is a slim chance that this extortion incident is taking place and that further harm may be possible, please contact us in a timely manner so that the truth can be found out as soon as possible. We believe in the power of cooperative ecological partners, and things can have a relatively optimistic outcome.
The original address: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/gxbEzT4ycPaWooMyPeuTyA
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