header-langage
简体中文
繁體中文
English
Tiếng Việt
Scan to Download the APP
Partnered With:

How to solve the problem of selective packing of miners on ethereum?

Read this article in 5 Minutes
Some DeFi have a bias in the benefit distribution of the transaction priority, and the earlier the transaction is packaged, or only one transaction is packaged, the greater the benefit.

Original title: "mineral pools are first regulated? On external incentives and new structures"
NEST fanatics NEST fanatics NEST fanatics NEST fanatics




With the continuous development of the blockchain world, the mining scale is getting larger and more difficult. The SOLO mining mode of early traditional small miners has been withdrawn from the market and replaced by a mining pool integrated with distributed mining calculation force:Some scattered miners entrust the management of mining machinery to professional organizations, and regularly settle the income from mining.The creation of the pool was once questioned by many decentralized fundamentalists, but once the meaning of bifurcation was fully understood, these doubts were resolved, and we will write a future article on bifurcation.

Despite concerns about decentralization, another pool issue has not been addressed:The problem of external incentives against the interests of miners! This will become more and more important in ethereum.

The so-called external motivation is the concept corresponding to the internal motivation. Before moving on to this concept, make clear the relationship between the miner and the pool party: this is a very clear principal-agent relationship in the traditional legal system, with the miner as the principal and the pool as the agent. In the principal-agent relationship, the agent shall maximize the interests of the principal within the agreed scope, and shall not use the convenience of the agent to do any transfer of interests or maximize their own interests (but not maximize the interests of the principal). This principle, while clear, is difficult to implement and requires some mechanism design to solve the problem of incentive compatibility: the agent maximizes his own interests and maximizes the principal's interests.

Based on the principal-agent relationship, we discuss the internal and external excitation of the ore pool.The so-called internal incentive, that is, the principal agent both sides agreed, in the scope of the contract and the value of the target and its distribution. In the case of mining, the internal incentive is to maximize the earnings from mining, including the ETH obtained by digging and the ETH obtained by packaging the transaction. Due to general mineral pool from acquiring a percentage of the total mining revenue into, so it is a contractual arrangements are theoretically incentive compatibility, namely mineral pools to maximize the benefit of the miners, only to maximize their own interests, or to maximize their own interests, nature is to maximize the interests of miners, this was the analysis to the internal incentive compatibility.




But on ethereum, things can change, and that change is the emergence of DEFI.

As we mentioned in a previous post on miners' risks, although miners cannot change the deal, there is the possibility of an alternative package deal.However, some DEFI have a bias in the priority of the transaction. The earlier the transaction is packaged, or only one transaction is packaged, the greater the benefit is.

At this time, the mining pool may be able to make use of its own computational advantages for the arrangement of related transactions.This arrangement did not completely damage the miners' interests, because the miners would still get the maximum mining benefits, or slightly lower mining benefits, i.eThe pool perfectly practices the internal incentives, but gains other benefits in DEFI through the arrangement of the package transaction. It's not in the miners' contract, it's not even in their contract, it's an external incentive.

The phrase front-running has been mentioned a lot lately, which refers to the miners above arranging a package of deals first,Already seen as a risk by the DEFI industry, the pools are the most likely to take advantage.If the pool gains a profit as a result, how should the ownership of that profit be determined? As I mentioned earlier, the pool and the miner have a traditional principal-agent relationship, and this benefit should strictly belong to the miner! Now the question is,If the pit does not disclose its packaging strategy, no one can invert the pit based on the data on the chain to see if the pit has obtained external incentives, the miners cannot prove! There is a black hole of trust.

Mineral pools, however, if the public policy and strictly implemented, while it is possible to avoid external incentive problem, the but again easily by some malicious attacker for, such as congestion attack strategy is very clear, or, in turn, the external incentive income by an attacker to grab downstream DEFI (illustrate the design to avoid similar front - running architecture), and even other more serious attack plan, let application developers in the chain of small-scale operations.

Thus the pool presents a paradox: open strategy-under attack, closed strategy-trust the black hole.



We propose a reasonable structure of ore pool: open random strategy arrangement.

According to the effectiveness of internal incentives, several reasonable packaging strategies are designed and disclosed. These strategies are to maximize the benefits of miners. The difference is the order or combination of packaging. Then, based on the random source of some hardware and the random algorithm of the software, they are combined into a mixed strategy (the strategy set of probability distribution), and the original data of the random source is saved for the miner to verify at any time.This scheme makes it impossible for an attacker to effectively capture the packing strategy and, for all miners, greatly reduces the likelihood that the pool will be externally motivated, thus filling the trust hole.Of course, evidence and regulation can come in handy if the pools do not strictly follow the process and still make a profit.

As the mining pool fully conforms to the setting of the traditional legal system, its supervision is based on a very strong theoretical basis, and it will be the most sensitive module of the public chain system in the future.It is also the easiest module to incorporate into regulation.This is the inevitable result of the orderly development of the whole public chain, and we believe that the mining pool structure we proposed will appear sooner or later.

Source link:https://bihu.com/article/1176898908



Welcome to join the official BlockBeats community:

Telegram Subscription Group: https://t.me/theblockbeats

Telegram Discussion Group: https://t.me/BlockBeats_App

Official Twitter Account: https://twitter.com/BlockBeatsAsia

Choose Library
Add Library
Cancel
Finish
Add Library
Visible to myself only
Public
Save
Correction/Report
Submit