BlockBeats news, November 11 - Scroll posted a report on its governance forum stating that on November 3, it received a vulnerability bounty report pointing to the Bundle proof verifier deployed on the Ethereum mainnet. On November 10, the team registered the fixed verifier for batch version 10 and confirmed that the vulnerability was not exploited on the Scroll mainnet.
The announcement stated that the old verifier, when making calls to the OpenVM 2.0 Halo2 verifier, would use the first 4 bytes of the proof provided by the caller as the function selector. If the proof starts with a specific selector, it could bypass the intended fallback path, causing an old valid proof to be accepted as new public input, ultimately confirming arbitrary state roots and withdrawal roots. Exploiting this vulnerability requires an authorized prover role or forced batch mode, which is activated after 7 consecutive days without final confirmation. Scroll stated that forced mode was never activated, all 748 final confirmations during the vulnerability's existence used regular proofs, and earlier versions of the verifier were also unaffected.
