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Full analysis of SushiSwap data: giant whales and thieves in sushi bars

Read this article in 24 Minutes
An article to understand SushiSwap's liquidity mining data, as well as the discovered SushiBar "thief".
Original title: "SushiSwap Farming Analysis"
Original source: Nanse, Akshay Ramasubramanian
Original compilation: 0x26


Rhythm note, this article is a liquidity mining analysis report written by SushiSwap sponsored by Nansen. And as of now, the new UI of SushiSwap v1.0.1 has been launched. The BUG (thief) section can be moved to the last section, the mysterious SushiBar.


Full text summary

 

This article analyzes SushiSwap's liquidity providers and how they handle mined SUSHI tokens.

 

The first choice for mining SUSHI tokens is SushiBar, and the largest is the SUSHI-WETH pool in SushiSwap. Cream and Uniswap are other preferred options for obtaining SushiShi.

 

The Nansen team also noticed some loopholes in the SushiBar contract, which will be discussed in depth later.

 

Introduction

 

SushiSwap is A decentralized AMM (automated market making) trading platform based on Ethereum.

 

In this article, we will delve into SushiSwap and focus on three things:

 

1. Liquidity Providers: Identify liquidity providers and see how they deal with mined SUSHI tokens.

 

2. Liquidity providers in different pools, especially Uniswap, Balancer and Cream.

 

3. According to the data studied before, delve into some interesting things in SushiBar.

 

Liquidity Provider Behavior

 

Number of SushiSwap Liquidity Providers

 

As of writing this report, there are approximately 10176 unique wallet addresses at SushiSwap provides liquidity. These are different Ethereum addresses that interact with the Sushi Liquidity Pool and lock two tokens in order to receive Sushi Liquidity Pool Tokens  , SLP tokens that provide liquidity to the protocol. Note that these addresses are not necessarily staking their SLP tokens.

 

The number of liquidity providers for each pool

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If we carefully analyze the previous data by the number of LPs providing liquidity to each pool, we can get a simple data summary table.




Most LPs (66.2%) only provide liquidity for one liquidity pool sex. Only a small fraction of LPs, about 4.2%, provide liquidity to more than 5 addresses.

 

  tags help us identify well-known addresses that provide liquidity. These labels also include the ENS domain name registered by the user. Digging into the tabs for each LP in Exhibit 2 below, we notice that most tabs have Dex Trader. All of this means that these addresses are often traded on decentralized exchanges (DEX).

 


 

We also found that SBF (17 pools) and boringcrypto.eth (15 pools), this prominent address is well known to the community. Well, with that in mind, let's move on to the analysis.

 

Based on this, it is fair to assume that when we look at returns per LP or the total flow per LP These addresses will reappear when permanently locked, as they appear to interact with multiple pools.

 

What percentage of total liquidity do LPs account for?

 

In this section we will look at the total liquidity provided by LPs. We will follow all transfers (ETH and tokens) from LP addresses to SushiSwap pools to calculate the total liquidity for each LP. Note that if an LP provides $10k of liquidity to the SUSHI-WETH pool, withdraws after a few days, and repeats the same process, this will be counted as 20k in total liquidity.

 

As we can see from the image below, the most eye-catching labels are Alameda and Three Arrows Capital, both of which Provided over $35 million in liquidity. Note that this is not the one SBF MultiSigner address from Alameda we mentioned in the previous section. This could mean that Alameda appears to use multiple wallets to interact with SushiSwap.

 


 

Most of these addresses have a Heavy Dex Trader label. This means that these addresses have done more than 500 transactions on DEX.

 

To better understand the distribution, we can draw a histogram. We split all the liquidity into groups to make things a lot simpler. The chart below shows the range of total liquidity in USD and the percentage of LPs that fall into this category.

 


 

It can be clearly seen that for a long time, most LPs provided ( 70.9%) with liquidity between USD 100-100,000. Some LPs provide liquidity of USD 100,000-1,000,000. In the end, only about 2.6% provided more than $1 million in liquidity.

 

How many LPs provide liquidity elsewhere?

 

It can be seen that most (more than 40%) SushiSwap limited partners also provide liquidity for Uniswap. Surprisingly, a large portion (24.2%) also provides liquidity to Balancer. A similar proportion (22.5%) of addresses only provide liquidity for SushiSwap.



 

This is interesting, Because people may have expected that most of SushiSwap's LPs have provided liquidity elsewhere, and are interested in transferring due to higher annual yields on other platforms, but according to the data, it seems that a considerable number of users (22.5%) only submit to SushiSwap provides liquidity.

 

Please note that since we only focus on Cream, Balancer, Uniswap and SushiSwap in this section, these users may Interacting with some other protocol that we didn't notice.

 

What is the distribution of SUSHI tokens per address?

 


 

About 11.9% of the addresses have mined 1,000 to 10,000 SUSHI. Only a minority (2.9%) mined more than 10,000 SUSHI. Most (68.5%) have mined between 10 and 1000 SUSHI.

 


 

Use the Nansen tag to dig deeper into the addresses of these SUSHI "farmers" and see Can we find something interesting.

 


 

In the above table, we can see that Alameda is the largest "farmer "one. Although the SBF MultiSigner address and boringcrypto.eth seem to provide liquidity to most pools, the same address does not appear in the top 35 list above. (SBF is the CEO of Alameda and may just be using multiple different wallets, as the Nansen tag appears to be taking multiple addresses labeled Alameda)

 < /p>

It is worth noting that there are some addresses that seem to be getting a lot of returns from SushiBar liquidity mining. You may think that all the addresses that have gained a lot belong to MasterChef (Rhythm note, supplementary link) to mine SUSHI tokens in the early stage, but from the above table, it can be seen that this is wrong. Several "farmers" are producing more tokens with SushiBar than MasterChef.

 

MasterChef mines SUSHI tokens with locked SLP tokens (liquidity tokens), and SushiBar includes locked sushi. See here for a more detailed explanation.

 

Note that if a user has not claimed SUSHI tokens at SushiBar, they will not appear in the analysis.

 

We’ll dig into this in more detail in the final section to discover what’s going on here.

 

Where did the SUSHI tokens mined by LP go?

 

To determine this, we can again utilize Nansen's label. For a more complete picture, we can try to group all the tags together, trying to understand where most of the SUSHI tokens are going.

 

Please note that these quantities may be higher than the total supply of SUSHI as it is entity below. Also, grouping tags doesn't tell us the specific action the user is taking. Because they may either lock the tokens in SushiSwap, or directly exchange them for other coins. A more detailed breakdown is provided below so that we can differentiate these actions.

 

The best known places to mine SUSHI are SushiSwap(23.5%), Cream(18%) and Uniswap ( 16.4%).

 


 


 

If we look at the centralized exchanges, Binance is number one on the list, but only 3.6% compared to DeFi platforms (SushiSwap, Uniswap, and Cream), which have much more SUSHI received.

 

We can look at the addresses that have registered ENS domain names and see if there is anything interesting to show. This is shown in the table below.

 


 

Here you can see some famous addresses in the Sushi community, such as zippoxer.eth.

 

In order to find more information about the transfer to SushiSwap, especially the actions taken by users, dig deeper for more details , below use the top address and label instead of sorting by platform.

 


 

As can be seen from the pie chart below, most SUSHI tokens were transferred to ( 29.7%) are all SushiBar. The second largest recipient is the SUSHI-WETH SushiSwap pool (22.8%). After digging into more details in this section, it appears that all of these transactions to the SUSHI-WETH pool are actually liquidity mining events, meaning they are actually LPs locking SUSHI + WETH into the liquidity pool .

 

The third largest was Cream with 18.1%, which we will discuss in more detail in the next section.

 


 

We can summarize the above information and conclude that a large amount of sushi Liquidity follows this path:

 

1. Lock SUSHI at SushiBar;

2. Add liquidity to SUHI-WETH pool;

3. Send LP tokens to Cream.

 

Mysterious SushiBar

 

As mentioned earlier, there are some non-MasterChef addresses that get a lot of SUSHI from SushiBar.

 

Dig deep into these addresses and noticed a series of really lucrative transactions. Let’s take a look at some more details of a top SushiBar yield mining address.

 

This externally owned account (EOA) appears to be entering and exiting the SushiBar frequently and within 12 Get 10+ETH profit in minutes. Here's a quick breakdown of what they're doing.

 

1. Get Sushi from Cream;

2. Stake Sushi to get xSushi (enter SushiBar);

3.12 minutes later;

4.xSushi get Sushi (leave);

5. Repay the Sushi loan in Cream;

6. Turn the obtained Sushi profit into WETH.

 

Discuss this issue in more detail through the number of tokens.

 

You can track these transactions by clicking on the Etherscan timestamp below.

 

1.Oct-06-2020 11:30:51 PM +UTC October 6-202011:30:51 PM +UTC: Call CreamFinance's "borrow" function to get 5,700,000 SUSHI tokens

2.Oct -06-2020 11:31:32 PM +UTC: By calling the contract, Stake 5,700,000 SUSHI to get 5,479,364 XSUSHI.

3.Oct-06-2020 11 :38:41 PM +UTC: After 7 minutes and 7 seconds, call the leave function of SushiBar to change 5479364 XSUSHI into 5705876 SUSHI and leave.

4.O ct-06-2020 11 :39:37 PM +UTC: Send SUSHI back to Cream, invoke the repayment contract, and repay 5,700,097 SUSHI loans (net profit is 5779SUSHI).

5. Oct-06-2020 11 :42:49 PM +UTC: Transform all profits into WETH (5779 SUSHI pieces are exchanged for 10.8 WETH pieces).

 

Then the wallet repeated a similar action the next day. The first step of the currency transaction link is here. If we look closely, the time span is slightly different, from 07 Oct 2020 10:46:51 UTC to 07 Oct 2020 10:57:17 UTC.

 

Initially we thought there might have been a spike in volume during that time, but a closer look at the Looking at volume, we found that only about 553 ETH equivalents were traded during that time period, and this trader borrowed SUSHI, staked tokens, and then swapped SUSHI back.

 

During these 7 minutes, the theoretical reward figure is about 5553.53 * 30bps * 5bps = 0.000083295 ETH. This is based on the rewards shown in the Sushi documentation.

 

That means this EOA actually seems to be taking advantage of the SushiBar and reaping huge rewards. If we look at the source code of the SushiBar contract, it looks like anyone can call the convert function and assign the reward.


Rhythm note, a metaphor for this thief (bug) image: every time the teacher rolls the roll (assigns rewards), it is there, after the click Name (after receiving the reward) and leave.  

 

Let's try to have a more comprehensive understanding of SushiBar and see the user's actual gain.

 


 


 

It can be seen from the chart above that jokap.eth Seems to get the most bang for your buck from SushiBar. This is also the address to get paid back from SushiBar with Cream Loans. Let's break it down into groups to better understand the distribution.

 



Only a small percentage of addresses (0.18%) got more than 10,000 SUSHI from SushiBar , most of them got 0-100 SUSHI tokens (94.8%).

 

After looking at the above vulnerability (if it can be defined as such), it seems necessary to rewrite the SushiBar logic, considering Lock-up duration of SUSHI tokens. It makes more sense to reward users who lock sushi longer (more blocks) than those who lock less blocks. This will also make it harder for users to exploit the system (vulnerabilities) seen in the example above.

 

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