Maker decentralized governance reform "egg" : synthetic assets, reserve vaults and voting incentives

Original title: DeFi Review no. 4 - special 2: Easter egg from Maker
Author: cao Yin

MIP1 links:https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip1-maker-governance-paradigms/1903

At the moment Maker issues only Dai, which is anchored at a 1:1 ratio to the us dollar, and Synthetix, the DeFi synthetic asset project, which also USES an over-collateralisation mechanism under the slogan of on-chain exposure to any asset, can synthesize dozens of other assets, even stocks and silver, in addition to the iUSD stabilization.

Bitshare, the former owner of Maker's founder, Rune, has long pledged to mint synthetic assets in various chains, including dollars.

In fact, it is not complicated to synthesize a variety of assets on Maker. The key is the predictive pricing mechanism. Moreover, unlike the Synthetix and Bitshare of SNX and BTS, the mortgage assets of Maker MCD are mostly ETH, whose liquidity and stability are far greater than those of BTS and SNX. Therefore, theoretically, making synthetic assets on Maker is much stronger and more convenient than Synthetix and Bitshare.

However, apart from the Problem Space list of MIP1, no governance system involving synthetic assets has been found in other places of item 13 MIB, so in the short term, Maker should not provide assets other than Dai, but in the medium and long term, the launch of multi-synthetic assets by Maker is a high probability event.

2. Maker is going to build a chain reserve vault?

Also in the Problem Space list of MIP1, Maker mentioned Guardian Entities and Reserves, and defined "to purchase and manage a diversified storage structure. Through the storage under the chain, Dai's reliability in the face of a market slump is improved. The storage and storage will also reduce the risk of MKR dilution."

MIP1 links:https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip1-maker-governance-paradigms/1903

MIB proposed the concept of reserve assets, which naturally reminds people of the central bank mechanism of a sovereign state. Although Maker is known as "DeFi central bank" by DeFi community, Maker is actually substantially different from modern central Banks.Mr Maker cannot take on the most important responsibility of modern central Banks: the role of backstop, unable to provide ultimate liquidity to markets. From the simple definition of the functions of Guardian Entities and Reserves by Maker in MIP, Maker seems to want to establish a mechanism similar to the central bank reserve, providing liquidity to Dai in extreme cases, and also avoiding dilution, issuance and auction of MKR to cover the system deficit.

But the question is, where did Maker's reserve assets come from?

Although there are a lot of mortgage assets in the Maker Vault, the Maker foundation is neither able nor able to use these contractual mortgage assets. The most likely reserve asset is the large number of MKR held by the Maker foundation. Maker may auction off some of the MKR held by the foundation, keep the raised dollars as reserves and keep them under the chain. In the event of another 312 crash, Maker could immediately use the dollars in his reserves to buy ETH or USDC (more likely USDC) and synthesize DAI, which would be released into the market to solve the liquidity crisis.

I have previously suggested a similar monetary policy operation, suggesting that Maker could add MKR as MCD collateral in an emergency of 312, and then cast the MKR emergency collateral held by the foundation into DAI and put it on the market. Compared to my suggestion, Maker's approach of auctioning MKR directly in a bull market and putting it on the market in an emergency is better in terms of capital utilization, legality and safety.

Cao Yin: how should Maker adjust monetary and fiscal policies under the liquidity crisis?

At present, Guardian Entities and Reserves are only mentioned in MIP1, so it can be considered that this is just an immature idea of the Maker foundation, and it remains to be seen whether and how to implement it.

3. Maker wants to stimulate voters economically?

Again, in MIP1's Problem Space list, the foundation mentioned 'Vote Incentives.' However, it differs from the previous Guardian Entities and Reserves and Synthetic Assets. In its 13 MIPS, as well as in its Blog, the foundation has repeatedly mentioned the need to financially motivate voters in order to increase the current very low turnout and create an active democratic proxy voting ecosystem.

MIP1 links:https://forum.makerdao.com/t/mip1-maker-governance-paradigms/1903

Good intentions, but the question is, how does Maker motivate voters? And how to incentivize proxy voters? At present, there are two main reasons why a large number of MKR do not participate in the voting: 1. The threshold of Maker governance is too high, requiring too much energy, and MKR holders do not have enough ability and energy to participate in the voting. 2. Many MKRS are in the exchange account and cannot vote.

Maker's future proxy voting mechanism will partially address the Maker governance threshold, but not the second reason that prevents users from voting. So if Maker wants to increase voter turnout, the financial incentives for MKR voters should outweigh the potential benefits of trading MKR so that MKR holders are willing to transfer MKR from exchange accounts to wallets to vote.

Source link:https://bihu.com/article/1988212778

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